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ABSTRACT
INVESTIGATIONS OF FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE, AND CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: A SURVEY OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOFTWARE-BASED AIDS AND
OBSTRUCTIONS
by
Lawrence Kom
Advisor: Professor F. Warren Benton
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption present significant challenges to the efficient use of public
resources and stifle government service improvement by detracting from policy development and
undercutting funding for important initiatives. The purpose of this study is to better understand the
aids and impediments to investigations of these offenses and provide a generalizable definition
for the mission of Inspectors General, the group tasked with monitoring and addressing these
offenses. This study also sought to identify the material role of software in investigations of Fraud,
Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. Through a purposive sampling, 18 Inspectors General from the
federal, state, and local level were interviewed using the Critical Incident Technique to help recall
cases investigated that they found significant. For each case data was collected on the
significance criteria for being included, whether the investigation was thorough and unimpeded,
and what outcomes were achieved. A quantitative analysis revealed no correlation between
whether it was a thorough investigation and the achieved outcomes. A second quantitative
analysis showed a strong relationship between material software support and outcomes of a legal
nature. For qualitative analysis a theme analysis of the self-described role and responsibilities of
investigators was conducted, offering a generalizable goal of: Investigating and rooting out fraud,
waste, and abuse, and a more inclusive: Prevent, investigate, and root out fraud, waste, abuse,
misconduct, and corruption to preserve or restore efficiency. Participants in the study diagnosed
case significance as primarily egregious cases that betrayed a public trust or impacted a
vulnerable group. Primary obstacles to thorough investigations were suspect cooperation,
political, evidence quality, jurisdictional, bureaucratic, legal limits, limited skillsets, scope, and
understaffing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The purpose of this research study is to better understand the aids and impediments to
investigations of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. The results of this study may aid in the
development of new investigative techniques and increase awareness of aids and obstructions to
investigations of this manner.
This study employed an in-person or over the phone survey with acting or former
investigators of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption in local, state, or federal government
positions. The respondents were approached at two conferences, 3 years apart, where
investigators met through a professional association. The survey instrument covered questions
on background including scope of their organization, authority, and their perceived mission. The
survey then employed the Critical Incident Technique to assist the respondents in recalling details
about cases they investigated in their role that resulted in critical success or failure as well as
their definition for such success.
For each case, qualitative and quantitative factors were recorded and modeled for a
binary logistic regression analysis using critical success as the dependent variable, defined by the
respondent’s assertion that a thorough investigation was able to be conducted without significant
obstacles. Qualitative analysis conducted on the data set sought to model the Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Corruption investigator’s perception of their role and accomplishments through the
Retributive Justice model.
Problem Statement
Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption are the use and misuse of public resources for
purposes not contingent with the mandate of the role of the official or contractor that was tasked
or sourced to provide public service. These offenses typically overlap and are used contingently
with each other in an effort to disguise ongoing infractions or advancing an existing scheme. At
their core definitions, these offenses stoke distrust at all levels of an organization, while each may
provide specific injury.
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Cases of fraud, defined in this study as the intentional deception committed to conceal
actions or transactions, violate public trust and challenge future budgetary discretion and support
for the impacted groups. Fraud cases act as a reminder to public sector officials and their
constituents that lying, cheating, and stealing can occur at every level of an organization and
injure the goals and morale of those dependent on the integrity of the organization; both as
participants and recipients.
Cases of waste, defined in this study as the use of financial and material resources or
personnel for purposes not directly related to the execution of duties and responsibilities of the
organization, demonstrate areas requiring additional oversight as well as stricter criteria for
spending, and further damage trust in the public sector use of finite resources.
Cases of abuse, defined in this study as the misuse, allocation or improper treatment of
financial or material resources or personnel to perform tasks and activities which may be directly
or indirectly related to the execution of duties and responsibilities of the organization, produce
results counter to the mandate tasked and damage confidence in the level of authority given to
the role or organization.
Cases of Corruption, defined in this study as the use of power for activities not authorized
by the position, envelops the aforementioned Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, using each to further
agendas that defy if not attempt to hinder the success of publicly mandated goals and attitudes.
Corruption among officials as well as vendors of government services create an unfair market, an
inequality in treatment by bureaucracy, and attack the integrity of the institutions as trusted
benefactors for public good.
Tasked with combatting these perils for organizations, Inspectors General have been
historically understaffed, under-resourced, and hindered by bureaucracy in pursuit of their
mandated mission to preserve and restore efficiency in organizations. At the time of this study
there is not adequate research on the topic that conducts specific interviews to identify the
specific impediments that these investigators observe and how they overcome or are hindered by
these obstructions.
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Inspector General Function
This study uses titled Inspectors General as a representative proxy group for watchdogs
and oversight roles tasked with combatting Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption in public affairs.
Inspectors General are responsible for defending against these offenses at the federal, state, and
local levels. According to Harris (2012) in Inspectors General: Exploring Lived Experiences,
Impediments to Success, and Possibilities for Improvement, despite there being significant
financial savings produced by Inspectors General, there are also significant external forces that
tamper the potential outcomes from these efforts, including budgetary limits on their work, political
interference, and insufficient authority to conduct thorough investigations.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 mandated the appointment of Inspectors General
(IGs) in the federal government by the President with advice and consent from Congress.
Inspectors General were prescribed to be independent and selected not based on political
affiliation but integrity and demonstrated investigatory skills relevant to identifying misuse of
public resources in a variety of accounting or management scenarios. Coming from a broad
background, Inspectors General also needed specific knowledge for the organization or agency
they would be tasked with investigating and monitoring, as each will have nuances and important
distinctions in services scoped and process. (Harris, 2014)
This study sought to diagnose specific obstructions experienced by Inspectors General at
the federal, state, and local level, as well as potential workarounds employed to combat these
impediments. From the qualitative side, this study also sought to identify common understandings
of mission from Inspectors General as each office has chartered their goals in different language
and with different scope and needs.
Workarounds to Investigation Impediments
Given the aforementioned impediments to successful completion or perceived successful
outcomes, this study’s survey instrument requested specific details on which impediments
investigators observed as well as if and how they were able to work around these obstacles. A
specific emphasis was also placed on the role that software plays in materially assisting an
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investigation and which specific software tools and features may have aided or been desired in
their work.
Research Questions
This study sought to obtain answers to five (5) research questions surrounding investigators
of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. The methodology for obtaining these answers is
described below for each question.
1. What outcomes are correlated with a successfully thorough investigation?
This study sought to understand what outcomes are contingent with cases identified as
successfully thorough by Inspectors General. This is accomplished through use of the Critical
Incident Technique to draw out cases that the investigators consider significant and attribute
specific outcomes to those cases.
The Critical Incident Technique requires respondents to characterize incidents they observed
in the context of success and failure. Respondents are asked to recall cases that occurred that
match the characteristic of success or failure related to accomplishing a critical task. This study
requested that respondents define what made each case significant, whether a thorough
investigation was able to be conducted, and what outcome(s) occurred.
This question is addressed by a number of binary logistic regressions using coded
categorical outcomes discovered during the interviews. The included outcomes are a known list
of likely outcomes for Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption cases, along with General Theory
informed outcomes learned from respondents. This list is further coded down to reduce the
number of possible dependent variables to ensure statistical significance within the available data
set and analysis. At the outset, the included outcomes include Legal (Arrest, Criminal Charges,
Indictment, or Conviction), Financial Recovery (whether any of the survey instrument scale values
were recovered), and Termination (if the case resulted in terminations).
2. What do Inspectors General see as their role?
Each respondent recently served or was currently serving as an investigator of Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Corruption. The survey requested that they provide the “general aim” of their
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investigative office. This question is addressed by a qualitative analysis of these responses,
looking at usage of terms and categorized by scope of mission.
•

What is their common general aim?

•

What makes cases significant?

3. What makes cases significant to Inspectors General?
As per Question 2, this study requested that respondents define what made each case
significant during the course of the Critical Incident Technique exercise. The responses from
Question 2 regarding what makes a case significant were then coded and thematically grouped
as factors that investigators shared as qualifying for significance.
4. What impedes a thorough investigation?
With each investigation that the respondents recalled, this study requested details of what, if
any, obstacles occurred during the course of the investigation that prevented a thorough
investigation from being conducted. Prevention of a thorough investigation was coded as Critical
Success or Failure for the purposes of the Critical Incident Technique and regression analysis.
This particular question is addressed with a qualitative analysis and categorization of the types of
impediments these investigators commonly experienced in significant cases.
In the course of the survey there was a natural explanatory narrative that occurred with each
case and with each investigator as they gave open-ended answers to some the survey questions.
Future study in this area would be served well by explicit request for workarounds but it was not
in the intended scope of this study. This study does seek software-based workarounds when
applicable.
5. Is software material to the successful completion of investigations?
The survey requested specific information about the use of software by investigators during
each investigation, whether it was material to the investigation, and which features they found
useful. The survey also requested the respondents to share whether there were specific software
features that could have been useful in each investigation.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, & Corruption
Investigations of fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption in the public sector have been
occurring in the United States since nearly its founding. The United States Postal Service created
the first investigative position in 1772, known as Surveyors, later becoming Postal Inspectors, to
investigate theft by those entrusted with US mail. The first Surveyor was appointed in 1775. In
1872 Congress enacted the Mail Fraud Statute further institutionalizing the effort to combat
misuse of the government-backed postal system in the wake of post-civil war scams. (United
States Postal Inspection Service, 2019)
At a more local level, New York State created the Office of the Commissioners of
Accounts in 1873 in response to hundreds of millions of dollars taken from New York City during
the Tammany Hall scandal. This office later became known as the New York City Department of
Investigation (DOI). DOI was granted subpoena power and administering oaths in 1884,
enhancing its investigative capabilities. DOI’s described mission is to attack corruption through
investigations leading to “high-impact arrests, preventative controls, and operational reforms”.
(New York City Department of Investigation, 2019).
Collectively, the actions performed by these investigators have been labeled fraud
examination, ending in reports of the investigations that successfully reconstruct past events and
provide justification for conclusions. (Gottschalk, 2019). These investigators may be public
servants, internal investigators, or private external investigators mandated by government to
perform investigations into the client organization. (Gottschalk, 2017) Investigators conduct their
work by collecting information from a variety of sources such as interviews with suspects,
document and email searches, and direct observation of actors. When a final report is published it
should have relevant consequences and justified conclusions. (Gottschalk, 2019).
While fraud reflects cover-up of theft, waste can be intentional or attributed to negligence,
and abuse is the misuse of authority, corruption overlaps and may encompass the former crimes.
Rose (2018) in The Meaning of Corruption: Testing the Coherence and Adequacy of Corruption
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Definitions, states that a variety of definitions are advanced internationally for what corruption is
but they suffer from incompatibility and weaknesses in scope. According to the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 2018 Global Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: Report
to the Nation: Government Edition, 47% of common occupational fraud schemes in government
agencies constituted corruption.
Further, different agencies and organizations are subject to different types of fraud,
waste, and abuse risks and require investigators to take on a variety of roles. Elder (2018)
outlines these roles as: (1) psychologist; understanding how and why someone may be drawn
toward dishonesty, balancing pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (2) assessor; performing
risk assessments unique to the organization, (3) controls expert; ensuring effective mitigations
and internal controls are established, (4) translator; establishing common understandings
between parties, (5) trainer; maintaining effective education on controls and ethics, and (6)
sheriff; both through enforcement and deputizing organization members to seek out fraud.
Inspector General Function
Passed following the Watergate scandal, the Inspector General Act of 1978 was created to
increase transparency and accountability in US government agencies. Inspectors General were
tasked with remaining independent and objective during this work. (Social Security
Administration, 2019) Since its inception, billions of dollars have been recovered on behalf of the
federal government or spent more efficiently. (Apaza, 2014)
According to Inspectors General: Exploring Lived Experiences, Impediments to Success, and
Possibilities for Improvement (Harris, 2012), Inspectors General are the signature line of defense
against fraud, waste, and abuse in federal programs. The Inspector General: Political Culture and
Constraints on Effective Oversight (Feldman, 2017) further explains that these investigators are
tasked with capacity-building, performance-enhancement, and compliance monitoring
responsibilities.
Inspectors General roles and responsibilities vary by prescribed legal mission and by
jurisdiction. Although two offices may have the same titles or labels, they may be enabled in
different ways. The Harris (2012) research covered both Federal and non-Federal Inspectors
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General, while the Feldman (2017) research delved into what international incarnation of this
activity could look like. The primary definition used by these studies to explain the mandate of the
Inspector General role was to combat fraud, waste, and abuse as a means of improving
efficiency.
Countering this mandate, Inspectors General are limited by budget, independence, and are
vulnerable to political influence. Their work is largely misunderstood and unknown by the public.
Harris’s research uncovered that Inspectors General challenges include limited influence over
their own budgets, limited ability to hire, and limited subpoena power, which he defined as
budgetary and structural inadequacies. Highlighting stakeholder communication as a significant
proponent to investigator success, this research helps illustrate the adaptation of each office’s
mission and tactics towards their tasked jurisdiction. (Harris, 2012)
According to Feldman (2017), there are also significant constraints on Inspectors General
power manifested by an institutional distrust written into the constitutional structure, as well as a
surveyed distrust that while encouraging compliance-monitoring, discourages capacity-building
and performance-enhancement. Feldman classified these constraints as coming from two
directions, one to expand power in the face of reprisal; the other to curtail and limit based on
unchecked power or unlimited independence.
According to Johnston in Coherence, Contrasts, and Future Challenges for Inspectors
General (2010), battling corruption naturally diminishes the support that Inspectors General
receive, both politically and institutionally, as they isolate themselves and disrupt status quo to
meet their independent watchdog requirement. Questioning how high profile the role should be,
Johnston cites benefits for media exposure but also a common public distrust in government that
manifests for all publicly visible roles. Further, the finding of corruption undercuts the Inspectors
General perceived success as corruption was not prevented.
Auditing and Investigational Software
Internal controls form a significant component of fraud detection and prevention,
regardless of being manual or computer-based. Auditing controls respond to attacks and failures
of control systems and are also employed as routine and periodic review mechanisms—each with
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their own specific vulnerabilities and risks for subversion. (Mercuri, 2003) Over the past 20 years
there has been a shift in control system software, as organizations have moved towards allinclusive enterprise-wide software known as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems;
previously known as Office Information Systems (OIS). (Bailey, Whinston, & Zacarias, 1989)
Essentially large-scale relational database management systems, they include Embedded
Auditing Modules (EAMs) that provide substantive auditing capacity. Study has shown that EAMs
are not effectively deployed by small, medium, and large organizations alike, primarily due to a
lack of demand from ERP purchasers. (Debreceny, et al, 2005)
ERP systems employ the resource-event-agent (REA) model of relational database
structuring, which identify specific resources being managed, the transactions or events that are
occurring in regards to those resources, and the personnel or entities involved in the transaction.
Policy-level definitions enable the semantic construction of REA structures, organized through
typification based on specific tasks, activities, and transactions conducted by an organization and
then grouping them according to the characteristics of these events. Geerts & McCarthy, 2006)
Study has shown that managers place a greater degree of importance on administrative controls
than the actual database designers. (Doty, Sen, & Wang, 1989)
In regard to these ERP systems, Grabski, Leech, and Schmidt (2011) reviewed past ERP
research, concluding that there are still many problematic issues to be studied. They organized
research by organizational impact, economic impact of the ERP system, and critical success
factors. This overview focused on accounting mechanisms but raised concerns that there is a
lack of research on risk management, regulatory issues, internal and external economic impacts
of ERP systems, interorganizational support, design deficiencies for management control, and
extensions needed for formats such as XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language).
Previous studies have evaluated internal control effectiveness in regards to use of
penalties as controls (Barra, 2010), how audit firm size accounts for automated and nonautomated internal control effectiveness (Janvrin, Bierstaker, & Lowe, 2009), and the role of
internal control training and education on management and employees—with a significant amount
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of interest in technological compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. (Klamm & Watson,
2009; Wallace & Cefaratti, 2011)
The majority of the research conducted in this field however, has been in regards to
training and education, covering experiential learning effects (Eining & Dorr, 1991), how effective
expert system frameworks are for internal control design (Brown & Murphy, 1990; Vinze, Karan, &
Murthy, 1991), Accounting Information System (AIS) coursework in the United States (Groomer &
Murthy, 1996; Bain, Blankley, & Smith, 2002), training and experience as an explanation for how
auditors evaluate automated and non-automated controls (Viator & Curtis, 1998), electronic open
exchange platforms for internal control methods and procedures (Lee, Dutta, Henry, & Nguyen,
2007), reviews of auditor understanding and usage of information systems (Burton, 2000;
Jackson, 2000; Curtis, Jenkins, Bedard, & Deis, 2009), as well as research literature reviews of
decision-making, governance, operations, and technology (PGOT) such as ERP systems.
(Grabski, Leech, & Schmidt, 2011; Neely & Cook, 2011)
In studying the extent to which these internal control systems have been evaluated, a
number of discussions have emerged among experts as to the correct methodology to evaluate
control system effectiveness, particularly when group dynamics are involved. A piece in 2000,
published in the Journal of Information Systems, suggested that group decision making around
internal controls is flawed because only information known by the entire group will end up going
into the decision making process. (O’Donnell, Arnold, & Sutton, 2000) Countering this argument,
Carnaghan suggests that the O’Donnell, Arnold & Sutton study presumed equivalent base
knowledge by the group members and did not take into account delegation of tasks. (Carnaghan,
2000)
Another reply to the discussion suggests that subjective responses to a questionnaire, as
employed in the O’Donnell, Arnold, & Sutton study do not align with the high level requirement of
controls system risk assessment. (Leech, 2000) In a rebuttal to these remarks, the original
authors of the study offer their methodology for evaluation as an alternative to control system risk
assessment, provided that all elements of the subjective narrative are documented and controlled
for. (O’Donnell, Arnold, & Sutton, 2000) A 1999 piece by Curtis & Borthick recommends
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organizing further by control objective—isolating out the area that is likely to be targeted by fraud
or abuse. (Curtis & Borthick, 1999) Other research indicates that determining or quantifying those
control points that should be emphasized must be the first step in an internal control audit.
(Fields, Sami, & Sumners, 1986) The purpose of these audits should be to assess control risk
that may affect subsequent detection risk. (Wu & Hahn, 1989)
While a number of studies have looked at specific information system-based internal
control activities (Burton, 2000; Jackson, 2000), training in these systems (Curtis, Jenkins,
Bedard, & Deis, 2009), and reliance by auditors on information system techniques (Viator &
Curtis, 1998); only one significant study has be conducted regarding specific activity usage. In the
2009 Janvrin, Bierstaker, & Lowe study, various factors were observed to influence which specific
internal control activities were conducted, with special concern paid to computer-related auditing
procedures. (Janvrin, Bierstaker, & Lowe, 2009) At this time there is no known study that
evaluates perceived effectiveness of internal controls.

Situational Crime Prevention
As this subject area employs the use of control systems to mitigate a perceived expected
level of risk or error, an ideal criminological platform to frame the research would be Situational
Crime Prevention (SCP). This theory, originating in 1980, is a child study area of Environmental
Criminology and the policy response to identifiable defensive spaces and the corresponding
offenses committed there. (Clarke, 1980; Clarke & Mayhew, 1980) Through the identification of
potential weak physical zones where crimes will be afforded a greater opportunity for
commission, designers and architects can utilize SCP to generate safety in existing problem
environments. Fundamental to SCP is the acceptance that crime will occur if there is suitable
opportunity, limited guardianship, and individuals who may rationalize the desire to commit the
crime.
As framing theories, rational choice and routine activities theory are often cited as the
appropriate background for promoting and developing defensible spaces. (Clarke, 1980, 1995,
1997) However there is an exception to the use of rational choice theory for guiding SCP
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regarding crimes of expression, which this analysis will not include in the context of auditing
information systems development. (Hayward, 2007) Generally SCP has been used to study
physical locations such as public spaces, housing complexes, and transportation facilities. This
analysis expands the usage of SCP, as other researchers have, to include non-physical locations
or “virtual environments” that auditing information systems may offer substantial protections for.
(Kapardis & Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; Willison & Siponen, 2009; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010)
Although Environmental Criminology encompasses a wide array of studies and
theoretical challenges when used to explain why crime is committed, the focus of how crimes are
committed arise through the study area of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED) which in turn spawns SCP as the policy response to existing problem areas. C. Ray
Jeffery originally coined the term CPTED in 1971, however it comes from a long line of
researchers focused on urban decay and the powers of surveillance to remediate crime
opportunities. (Jeffery, 1971; Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke, 2008)
Notable to the development of CPTED studies is the work of Oscar Newman who
conceptualized “defensible space” in 1973 while observing separate housing complexes whose
designs promoted and discouraged crime distinctly. Defensible space encourages designs that
enhance territoriality between public and private spaces through barriers, both symbolic and
physical. To prove out these claims, Newman performed a quantitative analysis based on crime
rates which has since been largely refuted for its unscientific nature and generalizations that
insisted crime was caused by the housing designs rather than the characteristics of the residents.
His later research has acknowledged that the resident’s characteristics are a greater predictor of
crime rate, while maintaining the role that environmental design plays in how crimes are afforded
the opportunity to occur. (Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke, 2008)
According to Newman, defensible space is comprised of four elements or capacities that
act individually and comingle: (1) to create perceived zones, (2) to provide surveillance
opportunities, (3) to reduce the perception of isolation, stigma, or uniqueness, and (4) to
juxtapose safe areas to influence the safety of adjacent areas.
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Drawing on defensible space and behavioral psychology, CPTED encompasses three
main strategies and three supplemental strategies. The primary three strategies are: (1) territorial
reinforcement or barriers and access control, (2) natural surveillance or increasing the perception
of being observed by residents, and (3) natural access control through spatial definition. The
three supplemental strategies are: (1) activity support or the encouragement of positive use of
spaces, (2) image/space management or simply keeping an area maintained, and (3) target
hardening or micro application of access control. (Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke, 2008)
Additional research in the CPTED field has spawned Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows”
(1982), criminal use of CPTED as “offensible space”, and an entire field of study dedicated to
“designing out crime” or design against crime (DAC). (Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke,
2008; Jacques & Reynald, 2012) Other researchers, such as Alice Coleman still contend that
design can cause crime, however for the purposes of this analysis the focus will be on crime
opportunity. (Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke, 2008)
What makes Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) unique compared to CPTED and DAC
is that it looks to existing problems rather than attempting to predict them. However, SCP along
with Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is informed by CPTED and DAC, which both look at what
has worked in the past to prevent displacement at the outset. (Guerette & Bowers, 2009)
Although initially challenged by the criticism that SCP will simply displace the crime it attempts to
diffuse, displacement of crime has not proven to be a substantial problem as previously thought.
(Clarke, 1995, 1997) As a crime control strategy, SCP offers valuable lessons to any existing
crime-specific response area. (Wortley, Mazerolle, Cozens & Clarke, 2008) Further research on
hot spot policing has promoted strategies that go beyond the work of SCP and are informed by
Crime Pattern Theory where emphasis is placed on guardianship in the crime area, and Crime
Opportunity Theory, which suggests that hot spots exist because criminals see them as practical
targets. (Weisburd, 2009)
The research of Von Lampe (2011) suggests that in the case of organized crime and
other spatiotemporal expansive crimes that are able to shape their environment to enable crime
commission, SCP requires a significant number of framework enhancements. (Von Lampe, 2011)
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As this analysis looks to apply SCP to auditing information systems that combat fraud, abuse,
and corruption, it may also encounter similar spatiotemporal concerns.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Research Method and Design
This study employed an in-person or over the phone survey with acting or former
investigators of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption in local, state, or federal government
positions. The respondents were approached at two conferences, 3 years apart, where
investigators met through a professional association. The survey instrument covered questions
on background including scope of their organization, authority, and their perceived mission. The
survey then employed the Critical Incident Technique to assist the respondents in recalling details
about cases they investigated in their role that resulted in critical success or failure as well as
their definition for such success.
For each case, qualitative and quantitative factors were recorded and modeled for two
regression analyses: 1) using critical success as the dependent variable in a multiple regression,
and 2) using outcomes of cases as a multivariate regression. Qualitative analysis conducted on
the data set sought to model the Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption investigator’s perception
of their role and accomplishments through the Retributive Justice model.
For security purposes and to encourage participant involvement, there were a number of
concerns that needed to be addressed regarding the data collection and storage process. To this
end, none of the phone conversations were recorded and all notes were hand-written, then
transcribed, and finally shredded. The resulting data files were maintained on an encrypted hard
drive utilizing the Apple “FileVault” feature. At the conclusion of this study, neither the jurisdictions
nor the respondents were identified.
The instrument used to conduct the phone interviews was based on data collected from
pilot questionnaires and committee consultation.

Data Reduction and Analysis Products
As directed by the Critical Incident Technique (CIT), this study procured one or more
incidents from each phone interview, which were classified first by specificity, then be used to
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contribute to the grounded theory improvement of the instrument, and finally categorized for later
analysis.
Critical to the success of using the qualitative to quantitative reduction methodology
offered by the Critical Incident Technique (CIT), this study maintains thorough documentation
(Flanagan, 1954; Butterfield, Amundson, & Maglio, 2005) and reflexivity notes (Merton, 1948).
Additionally, the intention of the study to improve auditing in public sector and private sector
organizations was shared with the interviewees.

Strategies for Credible and Rigorous Research
In order to maintain credible and rigorous research, this study conducted careful
purposive sampling (Patton, 1990) that was not convenience based, and member-checking
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) at the close of the interview, or in subsequent follow-up calls, to verify that
details have been collected accurately with the interviewee.
Additionally, this study offers consideration of alternative explanations as well as clearly
defined limitations. A complete discussion of Researcher Reflexivity (Merton, 1948) was
conducted to avert the potential for undisclosed bias in the resulting analysis. The study
addresses ethical concerns related to the subject material of fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption
by passively collecting data on past cases. The study also addresses the risk for interviewees
regarding exposure of potentially sensitive tasks and activities by anonymizing the data collection
and sanitizing the analysis output.
Critical Incident Technique
As detailed by John C. Flanagan’s The Critical Incident Technique (1954), the Critical
Incident Technique is a product of the Aviation Psychology Program of the United States Army Air
Forces during World War II, beginning in 1941. The program introduced a series of studies
designed to identify characteristics of effective combat leadership. The technique developed
called for requesting combat veterans to share incidents they had observed that they had found
to be “especially helpful or inadequate in accomplishing the assigned mission.” The purpose of
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this technique was to overcome stereotypical and clichéd reasoning given by instructors when
eliminating pilots from training schools.
By having respondents determine the difference between success and failure,
researchers were able to identify the essential requirements necessary for a job and factors that
led to the perceived failure to meet those requirements. Through first hand reports, the technique
was effective in obtaining objective records of errors made by the respondents, errors made by
superiors according to their subordinates, errors made by subordinates of respondents, and
errors made by respondents as reported by their co-respondents. (Flanagan, 1954)
Internal Validity
To ensure internal validity, that the relationships observed by this study are not explained
by alternative independent variables, this study:
1. Used purposive sampling to survey a representative sample
2. Recorded respondent’s supplemental values and expanded categories through grounded
theory.
In-person/Phone Interviews
The first series of In-person and phone interviews for this study were cleared by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New
York. A second series of In-person and phone interviews for this study were also cleared by the
then centralized Institutional Review Board at The Graduate Center, City University of New York.
Both processes required the primary investigator of this study as well as the Chairperson of the
Examining Committee for the study to complete the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative
(CITI Program) coursework to ensure compliance with responsible and ethical human respondent
policies. In both approved requests, the respective IRB panels were requested to approve
Exemption 3 for public officials.
Recruitment for respondents was conducted through the professional organization of the
Association of Inspectors General, headquartered at John Jay College. Individuals were
approached in-person and given a brief explanation of the intent of the study and a verbal request
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for participation and consent. In-person interviewees signed the consent form. Those who
requested to participate in a future telephone call gave verbal consent at the beginning of the call
following a complete re-reading of the consent script.
Individuals were approached directly to obtain consent for participation. The individual
records contain non-identifiable values that attribute the records to each interviewee. The
corresponding dataset that matches interviewees with their non-identifiable value was stored on a
separate encrypted hard drive. Aside from members of the committee for this study, no other
body was permitted to access the information and the study is being published without the raw
data set included.
The phone interviews were not be recorded, nor was in-person communication. The
primary investigator transcribed responses into a text document on an encrypted system using
Apple's Filevault encryption. No respondents are identified by this study and specific
organizational and investigation attributes are not connected to specific responses.
Three (3) years after the conclusion of the study, all identifiers will be permanently
removed from the data and destroyed.
The structure of the interviews was to first read the interview introduction script which
covered the purpose of the study: “to identify the aids and impediments to investigations of Fraud,
Waste, Abuse, and Corruption” wherein the results of this study may “aid in the development of
new investigative techniques and increase awareness of aids and obstructions to investigations”.
Those interested were then given IRB-approved waiver to be signed that they would like to
participate in the study. Telephone interviewees were read the waiver and requested to provide
an affirmation of their interest in participation.
The primary investigator then asked sequence of questions that sought to elicit first
categorical and demographic criteria about the investigator’s specific employment position.
Following this, a looping sequence of questions was asked wherein interviewees recalled cases
of the offense of fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption that they considered significant. At the
conclusion of each offense category, a request was made for any additional cases they might
consider significant for that category.
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During the interview, notes were taken by hand by the primary investigator for
transcription and destruction (shredding) at earliest convenience post-interview.
Survey Instrument
The survey instrument for this study was constructed to capture details about the
interviewees position as an investigator, their past experience, the demographics of their
investigative group, and the organization or body they were tasked to investigate and serve.
Question sequence was then asked for each incident type (fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption).
Interviewees were asked the same questions in the same sequence for a critical success
and failure incident. Each interviewee was able to decide whether success was first or second in
order when presenting recalled cases. At the conclusion of the critical success or failure
sequence, each individual was asked for another similar incident that took place when they used
different Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption (FWAC) software tools. 1
The critical incident technique calls for probing questions that are framed in the context of
success and failure in regard to the general aim of a position. In the context of this study, the
General Aim is to investigate potential fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption (FWAC)—although
one would attribute success to instances of FWAC with a successful legal outcome on behalf of
the agency, an unobstructed investigation is more aligned with successful execution of the duties
for that position. As such, critical success would be investigations that were not substantially
hindered.
The following questions were asked, and their complimentary reasoning is provided
below:

Question Series 1: Current Investigative Role

Question 1 - A: What is your current work position?

1

FWAC software is any software used to detect, uncover, organize, evaluate, make calculations
on, or otherwise investigate evidence relevant to an investigation of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or
Corruption.
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This question was used to determine the specific title of the position held by the investigator and
to ensure it was an investigative role.

Question 1 - B: When did you take this position?
This question was used to identify the time span of their current role, a later question captured
their previous experience for the purpose of stratifying responses by investigator experience
level.

Question 1 - C: How many investigators work in your investigative office?
This question identified the size of the respondent’s office for further stratification of responses
with their representative counterparts.

Question 1 - D: Roughly how many employees in your agency or organization is your
investigative office in charge of monitoring?
This question scaled each investigator’s work against the cases collected later in the survey,
offering magnitude categorizing for specific cases in relation to the size of the organization they
were tasked to investigate.

Question 1 - E: What is the general aim of your investigative office?
This question was used to identify the mission and goals that each investigator perceived to be
their mandate. Rather than collecting this information from the respective organization’s published
mission statement, this question helps provide context and authority for decision-making in each
incident the investigator shared.
Question 2: What were your previous work positions and when were they?
Complimentary to the question above regarding current work position, this question helped create
an understanding of the experience level for each investigator. This question also helped provide
matching organizational and investigative group meta information for incidents that did not occur
during their current role that they shared.
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Question Series 2: The Cases

Following the role and organization variable collection, the survey requested the
participants to think of the last major case of fraud that they investigated. A series of questions
followed. Then, if they identified significant obstacles (Question 4) during this case of fraud, the
question was repeated but requested a case that occurred without significant obstacles. If,
however, they identified no significant obstacles (Question 4) for that case of fraud, the question
was repeated but requested a case that occurred with significant obstacles to ensure maximum
coverage of case types.

Question 3: What made this incident significant?
This question was used to elicit a non-structured open-ended interpretation of what makes cases
of fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption significant. This would be further coded to determine if there
is a relationship between perceived success of an investigation, the outcome that occurred, and
the reason for the case being significant.

Question 4 - A: Were there obstacles that prevented a thorough investigation from being
conducted?
This question was used to categorize each case as Critical Success or Critical Failure. Critical
Success would mean the case was able to proceed without obstacles. Critical failure would mean
the case was prevented from receiving a thorough investigation due to obstacles.

Question 4 – B: What were those obstacles?
This question was an open-ended response for what particular obstacles impacted the thorough
investigation of this particular case. This data would later be analyzed for simplified coding as
common or uncommon obstacles that impede through investigations.

21

Question 5: Would you briefly describe the facts of this incident?
This question left for an open-ended general description of the incident, recorded for content
analysis and potential extraction of the subcomponents 5-A through 5-D.

Question 5 – A: When did this incident occur?
This question requested temporal identification of the fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption incident.
It does not force a format and was coded later to year of occurrence. The primary purpose of this
question was to ensure that data collected reflected recent or at least temporally grouped
information system standards used by investigators.

Question 5 – B: Who, by position title, was involved in the incident?
This question was created to identify if the position of the suspect in the incident was related to
the perception of success or failure of a thorough investigation and to the outcome(s) recorded.

Question 5 – C: If applicable, what or how much was missing?
This question was designed to categorically bucket cases by their financial impact as a further
predictor of success or failure of a thorough investigation, or relevant recovery outcome.

Question 5 – D: Who, by role, was involved in the investigation?
This question captured the composition of the investigatory team open-ended to result in either a
specific team description or at least a count of the personnel involved.

Question 6: Did you use any software to materially assist you in performing the investigation
functions for this incident of [incident type]?
This question was included with the purpose of identifying the impact of software on an
investigation as an independent binary variable.

Question 6 – A: If yes:
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i.

Which software did you use?

This question offered an open-ended retelling of which software was used, as specific as the
respondent was ready to share or recalled.

ii.

Which specific features did you find useful in this investigation?

This question was included to identify the specific features in 6Ai that they recalled being
materially useful to the investigation.

Question 6 – B: If no:
iii.

Was there a specific software feature or features that could have been useful to you in
this investigation?

Question 6 – C: Were there any software-related issues that hindered your investigation, either
due to:
This question was asked of each respondent, regardless of whether they stated that there were
software used that materially hindered in performing the investigation. This question allows this
study to model software hindrance as a binary variable in planned regressions.

i.

Software limitations? What was the workaround?

This question was asked to determine if there were software limitations and if any workarounds
were employed.

ii.

Software usage difficulties? What was the workaround?

This question sought to determine if there were difficulties using software that hindered the
investigation and again, the workarounds that alleviated these obstacles.

iii.

Other factors? What was the workaround?
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Concluding the material software impact questions, an open-ended response was requested for
whether other software related factors hindered the investigation.

Question 7: Which of the following outcomes can be attributed to this incident?

For the purpose of creating a multivariate multiple regression, this question requested
whether each of the following outcomes were present in this case and/or if it was still pending
outcome. Each was asked and recorded as a binary value, with the exception of “Financial
Recovery” where each bucket of recovered percentage was offered and one was selected by the
respondent, and the open-ended request for “Other” outcomes.
Indictment and Criminal charges are captured to provide a catch-all measure of whether
charges of any kind were formally filed as the process varies by jurisdiction and either option may
or may not be available—for the purposes of analysis this will be coded as any charges.

•

Criminal Charges
Criminal charges are included as a component of the intended grouping of legal
outcomes.

•

Indictment
Indictment is included as a component of the intended grouping of legal outcomes,
although similar to criminal charges, it may be the only option or an alternative option in a
given jurisdiction.

•

Termination
Termination is intended to be included as its own outcome in further analysis.

•

Arrest
Arrest is included as a component of the intended grouping of legal outcomes.
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•

Conviction
Conviction is included as a component of the intended grouping of legal outcomes.

•

Financial Recovery
Financial recovery is intended to be included as its own outcome in further analysis. Four
options are given to the respondent.

•

o

Full 100%

o

Greater than 50%

o

Less than 50%

o

No Recovery

Case still pending
Case still pending is included to explain if no other outcomes had occurred yet and for
future study.

•

Other
Other is intended to aid in the capture of Grounded Theory additions to the outcome
analysis.

Question 8: Can you think of another significant case of [incident type] in the past similar to this
one, either in your current position or a past position, where you were using different software for
material support in your investigation?
This question was used to illicit additional cases as part of the Critical Incident Technique of
triggering memories of semantically similar cases.

Analysis & Models
Quantitative Analysis
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This study uses two series of binary logistic regressions that use each coded outcome as
dependent variables. The first (1) series of regressions uses Critical Success as the independent
variable, this is to answer how, if at all, having a thorough investigation can be a predictor for
each outcome. The second (2) series of regressions tested the impact of software on the same
dependent variable outcomes.

The binary logistic regressions were conducted with Enter method in series one (1) using
Critical Success and Critical Failure, coded as 1 for success and 0 for failure, as an independent
variable, and in series two (2) using Software Assistance, coded as 1 for software materially
assisted the investigation and 0 for having no.. The dependent variables were the categorical but
potentially overlapping outcomes, run individually. The significance level used for all tests was
0.05, allowing for a 5% risk that a relationship discovered was a false positive.

Assumptions
The binary logistic regressions meet the four (4) assumptions needed to fit the model.
The first assumption, that the of a dichotomous dependent variable, is met by the binary coding of
the various outcome dependent variables used. The second assumption, having one or more
independent variables, is met by using the Critical Success or Software Assistance predictors.
The third assumption, requiring independent observations with variables that are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive is met by recording the values as attributes independent of collinearity
in the design. The fourth assumption, requiring linearity between continuous independent
variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable, is met by using a binary value
predictor. (Stoltzfus, 2011)

Series One (1) Binary Logistic Regressions for predicting impact of Critical Success on the
grouped outcomes.
Dependent Variables:
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VARIABLE
LEGAL

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

TERMINATE

BINARY VALUE

POLICY
RECOVERY

BINARY VALUE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Any Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or
Conviction
Termination, forced resignation, forced
retirement, or debarred
Any policy change
Any financial recovery

Independent Variables:
VARIABLE
CRITICAL_SUCCESS

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Was a thorough investigation able to
occur

Series One (1) Binary Logistic Regressions for predicting impact of Software Assistance on the
grouped outcomes.

Dependent Variables:
VARIABLE
LEGAL

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

TERMINATE

BINARY VALUE

POLICY
RECOVERY

BINARY VALUE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Any Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or
Conviction
Termination, forced resignation, forced
retirement, or debarred
Any policy change
Any financial recovery

Independent Variables:
VARIABLE
SOFTWARE_ASSIST

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Was any software used to materially
assist you in performing the
investigation functions for this incident

Qualitative Analysis
In addition to the quantitative analysis, a third (3) analysis was conducted in this study to
look qualitatively at the types of obstacles observed by investigators and model the phenomenon
of obstacles in Inspectors General work. These obstacles were coded down to macro categories
to explain what impacts a thorough investigation from being concluded.
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A fourth (4) qualitative model was created from the interview question requesting why a
particular case of fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption was perceived to be significant by the
investigator. These responses were coded down to larger categories that offer explanation for
what types of cases that investigators find significant. Due to a substantial amount of investigator
discretion (Feldman & Eichenthal, 2013) this helps explain how cases are selected and prioritized
by Inspectors General.
A fifth (5) analysis was conducted on the responses to describing the mission of their
office as investigators. This analysis looked at word usage and provides a common frequency
image of what an Inspectors General office considers their primary task and how they see their
role as investigators.
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Chapter 4: The Results
Data Collection Summary
This study collected cases from 19 respondents who identified themselves as either a
General Investigator, Inspector General, Investigator, or Special Agent (See Table 3. Respondent
employment and organizational attributes). The collection occurred during two events, one in Fall
2013 and the other in Fall 2016 via the professional organization of the Association of Inspectors
General, headquartered at John Jay College.

Figure 1. Breakdown of respondent job positions.

Repondent's Job Position

17%

5%
General Investigator
Inspector General

11%

Investigator
Special Agent

67%

These 19 interviews resulted in 74 cases of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or Corruption, each
with a large group of binary attributes and contextual values. The cases were broken down as: (1)
Fraud: 32 out of 74 (43.24%), (2) Waste: 17 out of 74 (22.97%), (3) Abuse: 13 out of 74 (17.57%),
and (4) Corruption: 12 out of 74 (16.22%). According to the respondents, it is possible for a case
to be more than one of these four (4) categories, however the survey instrument categorized at
the outset by asking for a case that met one of the categories. Respondents were not asked for
additional categorization for each case in this study.
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Figure 2. Total cases of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption collected.

Total Cases of "FWAC" Collected
35

32

30
25
20
15

17
13

12

10
5
0
Abuse

Corruption

Fraud

Waste

Table 1. Total respondents, cases collected by type.

METRIC
TOTAL RESPONDENTS
TOTAL CASES
ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE

COUNT
19
74
13
12
32
17

Questions 1 and 2: Respondent Background
Respondents were asked for their background during the setup phase of the interview,
providing information on their previous employment, their current position and tenure there, the
size of their investigative office, and the size of the agency or organization they were tasked with
investigating. The minimum tenure at their current investigative position was 1 year and the
maximum was 16 years so far, with a median year in current position of 3.5. The sizes of the
investigative offices ranged from 1 to 600 with a median of 11 investigative personnel. Although
not all respondents provided the size of the group they were tasked with investigating, the range
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was 100 to 500,000 persons, with a median population of 4,000. With the exception of 2
Attorneys and 2 whose role was unknown, 15 of the 19 respondents held an investigative,
auditing, or law enforcement position prior to their current investigation role.

Table 2. Respondent employment and organizational attributes.

Position

Previous Position

General
Investigator
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Investigator
Investigator
Special Agent
Special Agent
Special Agent

Probation Officer
Unknown
Attorney
Inspector General
Investigator
Police
Auditor
Investigator
Attorney General Office
Unknown
Special Agent
Military
Auditor
Attorney
Military
Investigator
Investigator
Unknown

Years in
Current
Position

Size of
Investigative
Office

Size of Group
Investigated

2

5

100

2
5
6
2
5
4
5
1
11
16
1
3
2
4
13
1
2

350
30
4
6
2
13
17
12
13
10
1
9
4
10
15
600
38

25,000
50,000
20,000
9,000
4,000
7,000
600
500
4,000
4,800
60,000
500,000
160,000

Questions 3: Significance of Case
Question 3 requested the reason that the fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption case was
considered significant by the respondent. The data collected for question 3 was coded down to
common themes based on the value of the answer and checked for compatibility with the totality
of the explanation given for each case, with multiple reasons for significance attributed when
applicable. To prevent coding biases and mistakes, no additional themes were applied if they
were not expressly mentioned by the respondent. For example, to qualify for the Financial
Amount label, the respondent needed to explicitly state that the amount was notably high or
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similar language. A case that exemplified similar characteristics was not coded as Financial
Amount if the respondent did not make that determination verbally.

Table 3. Matching cases by reason for significance.

REASON FOR SIGNIFICANCE

MATCHING CASES

FINANCIAL AMOUNT
VULNERABLE GROUP
MISAPPROPRIATION
HIGH RANKING OFFICAL
ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE
PUBLIC DISPLAY OF ABUSE
NUMBER INVOLVED
CORRUPT PUBLIC SERVANT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
BRIBERY
GOOD INVESTIGATION
PUBLIC SAFETY
CLEAR REMEDY
JAILTIME
WENT TO TRIAL

17
15
12
8
6
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Further coding of the significance label to a macro level was conducted, grouping
position-based significance into a new variable called Position of Suspect and abuse related
values into a new variable called Abuse of Power. The remaining values were put into a similar
sized category label called Other Notability.

Amount
The financial value of the fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption was the most common
reason given by respondents for a case being significant, occurring in 17 of the 74 cases
(22.97%). For the respondents that cited financial amount for case significance, all 17 cases were
for large amounts or frequent disbursements.

Vulnerable Group
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The category of vulnerable group was assigned to 15 out of the 74 cases (20.27%)
shared by respondents. The specific vulnerable groups covered in the 15 cases were those
medically disadvantaged, inmates, charities, veterans, firefighters (public servants), and children.

Other Notability
Other notability was assigned to 14 out of 74 cases (18.92%) shared by respondents,
wherein the response did not meet any of the other categories mentioned. The specific reasons
provided were: (1) aggressive adversaries who pursued legal and extralegal maneuvers to
obstruct investigation progress, (2) cases involing bribery, (3) there being a clear remedy to the
infraction investigated, (4) a particularly thorough or comprehensive investigation, (5) the number
of persons involved, (6) a threat to public safety, (7) the case going to trial, and (8) someone
receiving jail time as a result of the investigation and prosecution.

Position of Suspect
The position of a suspect was attributed to 14 out of 74 cases (18.92%) as a reason for
significance. This is further broken down into (1) corrupt public servants that are not high ranking
or law enforcement, (2) high ranking public officials, and (3) corruption by law enforcement.

Misappropriation
Misappropriation was attributed to 12 out of 74 cases (16.22%) as a reason for
significance. Misappropriation cases included timesheet fraud, using government resources for
private use, spending earmarked funds on non-designated expenses, fraudulent use of expense
account, and contract fraud.

Abuse of Power
For 14 out of 74 cases (14.86%), the respondents cited abuse of power as a reason for
significance for that case. This was broken down into abuse of privilege (6 cases) and public
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display of abuse (5 cases) where the employee, official, or contractor publicly flaunted their
violations or their proceeds.

Table 4. Matching cases by macro reason for significance.

CATEGORY
AMOUNT
FINANCIAL AMOUNT
VULNERABLE GROUP
VULNERABLE GROUP
OTHER NOTABILITY
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
BRIBERY
CLEAR REMEDY
GOOD INVESTIGATION
NUMBER INVOLVED
PUBLIC SAFETY
WENT TO TRIAL
JAILTIME
POSITION OF SUSPECT
CORRUPT PUBLIC SERVANT
HIGH RANKING OFFICAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION
MISAPPROPRIATION
MISAPPROPRIATION
ABUSE OF POWER
ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE
PUBLIC DISPLAY OF ABUSE
GRAND TOTAL

MATCHING CASES
17
17
15
15
14
2
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
14
3
8
3
12
12
11
6
5
83

Questions 4: Thorough Investigations
For the 74 cases shared by respondents, waste cases had the highest success rate with
47.06%, abuse cases perceived successful at 38.46%, fraud cases at 37.5%, and corruption
cases at 25%. The average critical success rate for cases was 37.01% across all cases
observed.

Table 5. Total cases, critical success or failure, and success rate by type.
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CASE TYPE
FRAUD
WASTE
ABUSE
CORRUPTION

CASES
32
17
13
12

SUCCESS CASES
12
8
5
3

FAILURE CASES
20
9
8
9

SUCCESS RATE
37.50%
47.06%
38.46%
25.00%

74

28

46

37.01%

When removing cases still pending outcome(s), the total number of non-pending cases
was reduced to 51. Of those 51 cases, the overage average success rate went down to 33.21%,
with waste cases still leading in success rate at 42.86%, abuse cases at 40.00% successful,
fraud cases at 27.78%, and corruption cases at 22.22%.

Table 6. Total cases, critical success or failure, and success rate by type, for cases not pending outcome
only.

CASE TYPE
FRAUD
WASTE
ABUSE
CORRUPTION

CASES
18
14
10
9

SUCCESS CASES
5
6
4
2

FAILURE CASES
13
8
6
7

SUCCESS RATE
27.78%
42.86%
40.00%
22.22%

51

17

34

33.21%

Obstacles
Macro level obstacles have been coded to distinguish between interaction with the
suspect, the quality of evidence, political pitfalls or hurdles, jurisdictional challenges, impact of the
bureaucratic process, and a variety of challenges that relate to powers and capability of the
investigator’s office in the context of their investigation scope or qualities.

Table 7. Obstacle themes and matching case counts.

CATEGORY

COUNT

SUSPECT COOPERATION

14

EVIDENCE QUALITY

13

35

POLITICAL

13

JURISDICTIONAL

9

BUREACRATIC

8

LEGAL LIMITS

6

LIMITED SKILLSETS

4

SCOPE

3

UNDERSTAFFING

3

Suspect Cooperation
Out of the 74 cases included in this study, 14 listed suspect cooperation (18.9%) as an
impediment to a thorough investigation. The obstacles that were categorized this way all reflect
actions taken by suspects that withheld information related to the case or pushed back against
the investigatory process. Suspect cooperation obstacles can be summarized as refusing to
provide records including preventing the flow of information to relevant parties (5 cases) colluding
with others (2 cases), leaving a position (2 cases), or retaining counsel (5 cases).

Evidence Quality
For 74 of cases surveyed, 13 listed evidence quality (15.6%) as an impediment to a
thorough investigation. Evidence quality issues could be further categorized as :(1) untrustworthy
evidence such as falsified records or testimony, and (2) poor records kept, either a lack of
evidence or low-quality evidence.

Political
For 13 of the 74 cases, the respondents listed political issues (15.6%) as an impediment
to a thorough investigation. Political issues can be further categorized as: (1) political power and
ties of the suspect, and (2) organizational political pushback.

Jurisdictional
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Out of the 74 cases included in this study, 9 listed jurisdictional issues (12.2%) as an
impediment to a thorough investigation. Respondents cited an often-uncooperative interagency
landscape for these cases, where competing agencies had different processes and role
expectations.

Bureaucratic
Out of the 74 cases included in this study, 8 listed issues associated with bureaucratic
systems (10.8%) as an impediment to a thorough investigation. The respondents described an
array of issues specifically attributed to the legally defined bureaucratic policies and system they
were working with or within. These can be grouped by whether it reflects a process being: (1)
inherently flawed, or (2) done with intent or by negligence.

Legal Limits
For 6 of the 74 cases shared by respondents, legal limitations (8.1%) were listed as an
impediment to a thorough investigation. The legal limitations shared were lack of independence,
insufficient powers with specific interest in subpoena power, and statute of limitations.

Limited Skillsets
Limited skillsets were associated with 4 of the 74 cases (5.4%) as an impediment to a
thorough investigation. The specific obstacles reported were insufficient training, dealing with new
technology, lacking specific expertise on staff, and an inability to identify missing skillsets or fill
those roles.

Scope
The scope of the investigation was listed as an impediment to a thorough investigation in
4 out of 74 of the cases (4.1%). The specific obstacles observed were case complexity, volume of
documents and case material, and time commitment.
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Understaffing
Staffing limitations were associated with 4 out 74 cases (4.1%) as an impediment to a
thorough investigation. Staffing limitations covered inadequate staffing of both the investigator’s
office as well as relevant aiding groups.

The breakdown for these categories has been summarized below, removing specific
details about the cases investigated in lieu of the fundamental concern raised. These descriptions
reflect a redux of the values for the purpose of sanitizing specific case details and giving familiar
language—the classification work was done prior to the sanitization routine.

Table 8. Obstacle themes and specific obstacle breakdowns.

OBSTACLE
SUSPECT COOPERATION
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
COLLUSION, SOMEONE ALERTED SUSPECT
DIRECTOR UNCOOPERATIVE, STALLED, WITHHELD
RECORDS, HIRED ATTORNEY
LACK OF COOPERATION
MISSING INFORMATION FROM SUSPECT
ORIGINAL EMPLOYEES NO LONGER WITH GOVERNMENT
REFUSED TO PROVIDE RECORDS, RETAINED COUNSEL
RESISTANCE FROM EMPLOYEES TO CHANGE
LONGSTANDING CORRUPTION
SUSPECT ALREADY LEFT POSITION
SUSPECT RETAINED LEGAL COUNSEL
SUSPECTS PREVENTED INFORMATION SHARING WITH TOP
WITHHOLDING INFORMATION, CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS
POLITICAL
BUSINESS HAD CLOSE TIES
CITY MANAGEMENT WAS APPREHENSIVE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR STALLED
FEAR OF RETALIATION, "OLD SCHOOL" MENTALITY
HINDERED BY SUSPECT'S POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
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COUNT
14
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
13
1
1
1
1
1

LACK OF HIGHER MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
LEADERSHIP BIAS DESPITE BRIBERY ALLEGATIONS
LEGAL ATTENTION AND HURDLES DUE TO GOVERNMENT
MISTAKES
NO POPULAR OPINION TO ARREST
POLITICAL OBSTACLES
SENIOR PLAYERS UNAWARE OF IG AUTHORITY
TARGET WAS POLICE COMMANDER, SWORN STATUS
WELL CONNECTED
EVIDENCE QUALITY
1980S DATA SYSTEMS, UNABLE TO GENERATE FORMAT
NEEDED
COMPLAINANT HAD REPUTATION FOR DISHONESTY
FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
INADEQUATE RECORDS WITH CONTRACTOR
LACK OF DOCUMENTS, OLD TESTIMONY
LACK OF RECORD KEEPING, LACK OF DOCUMENTED
PROCEDURES, POOR DOCUMENT FOR CHAIN OF CUSTODY
MAJORITY OF INTERVIEW WAS FALSIFIED INFORMATION
MISSING RECORDS
SMART TECH PEOPLE HID MONEY WELL.
SUSPECT TAMPERED WITH EVIDENCE IN DATABASE
UNDER REPORTING, INACCURATE REPORTING
VIDEO EVIDENCE FAILURE, BECAME HIS WORD VS HIS
WORD
JURISDICTIONAL
COMPETING AUDITING AGENCIES
DEALING WITH OTHER STATE AGENCIES
INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIP/ROLES
INTERAGENCY DIFFERENCES
INTERAGENCY DISPUTE ABOUT OWNING PROCESS,
EVIDENCE, RELEASE
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, DIFFERING SOFTWARE
NEEDED TO FIND TRAVEL MONEY
PARALLEL FEDERAL INVESTIGATION
SEVERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED
BUREACRATIC
AGENCY SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED IT
CHALLENGE OF WORKING WITH POLICE
CHALLENGING JURISDICTION TO NAVIGATE
DELAY IN SUBPOENA RESPONSES
INADEQUATE PROSECUTION
MANAGEMENT WANTED INFO BEFORE INVESTIGATION
COMPLETE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WROTE LAWS AND KNEW WAY AROUND
THEM
SUSPECT COULD REVIEW ALL TESTIMONY
LEGAL LIMITS

39

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6

INSUFFICIENT SUBPOENA POWER
LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
LIMITED POWER
NEEDED COURT ORDER TO GET CORRECT SUBPOENA
NO SUBPOENA POWER, SUSPECTS RETAINED COUNSEL,
REFUSED TESTIMONY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
LIMITED SKILLSETS
INSUFFICIENT STAFF TRAINING BEFORE ON-THE-JOB
LACK OF STAFF EXPERTISE
NEW TECHNOLOGY
NOT ENOUGH ABILITY TO ASSES OR RESOLVE
SCOPE
COMPLEX, LOTS OF DOCUMENTS
TIME AND VOLUME OF CASE MATERIAL
UNDERSTAFFING
INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES
NOT ENOUGH MANPOWER

1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
3
2
1

Question 5: Case Specifics
Case specifics were largely collected as a catch-all for potential details that may not have
been able to be extracted using the specific questions above or below in the survey. Case
descriptions were free-flow narratives and were used as a guiding aid for clarifying specific coding
routines in Question 4.
Question 5 also requested 4 subcomponents for each case to identify when the case
occurred and details about the scope of the financial component. For coding, case year used the
median when given a range. Most cases in this study occurred between 2009 and 2016. The
average number of cases collected per year were 5.5 with a median of 4.5.

Figure 3. Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption cases investigated by year.
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Cases by Year Occurred
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Financial component, or potential financial loss as a result of the fraud, waste, abuse, or
corruption was coded into buckets of less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $999,999, and
$1,000,000 or greater. The majority of cases stayed within the range of $50,000 to $2,000,000.
Figure 4. Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption cases by financial amount missing or in question.

Financial Amount in Question
19.5
19
18.5
18
17.5
17
16.5
16
15.5
15
14.5
$0 to $99,000

$100,000 to $999,999

Question 6: Software role
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$1,000,000+

While Question 6 was designed to capture details about the material role that software
played in conducting thorough investigations, the leading question of whether software material
assisted or not was the only consistently answered question amongst respondents. Additional
supporting details were also collected but only 3 of the 18 respondents provided specific details
about the features, limits, workarounds, difficulties, or other relevant details about the specific
software.
As per Question 6Ai, respondents were asked which specific software they had used to
materially support their investigations. Of the 65 cases that provided details on the software used,
48 (73.8%) of cases utilized spreadsheet software, 16 (24.6%) of cases utilized database
software, generally proprietary to the investigated group, such as Motor vehicle databases and
personnel systems, or Lexis Nexis, 8 (12.3%) used case management software, 15 (23%) used
forensics software for data analysis, and 3 (0.5%) specified case-specific software opportunities
such as video surveillance or office networking firewall logs.

Table 9. Types of software used for each case.

TYPE OF SOFTWARE
SPREADSHEETS
DATABASE
CASE MANAGEMENT
FORENSICS
OTHER

MATCHING CASES
48
16
8
15
3

Question 7: Outcomes
Of the cases recorded, 51 out of 74 (68.92%) were still pending outcome(s) according to
the respondents. For the cases marked no longer pending outcome(s), 21 out of 51 (41.18%) had
charges filed for at least one suspect, 14 out of 51 (27.45%) had at least one indictment, 21 out of
51 (41.18%) had at least one termination, 19 out of 51 (37.25%) had at least one arrest, and 17
out of 51 (33.33%) resulted in at least one conviction. This survey did not request specific counts
on the total charges, indictments, terminations, arrests, or convictions as a direct result with this
case.
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Table 10. Case outcomes by case type with no pending additional outcomes.

ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

TOTAL
10
9
18
14
51

CHARGE
3
5
13
0
21

INDICTMENT
4
1
9
0
14

TERMINATION
3
3
10
5
21

ARREST

CONVICTION

4
4
11
0
19

3
3
11
0
17

For the remaining 23 out of 74 (31.08%) of cases still pending outcome(s) according to
the respondents, there were some outcomes recorded so far. Of these cases, 21 out of 51
(41.18%) had charges filed for at least one suspect, 14 out of 51 (27.45%) had at least one
indictment, 21 out of 51 (41.18%) had at least one termination, 19 out of 51 (37.25%) had at least
one arrest, and 17 out of 51 (33.33%) resulted in at least one conviction. This survey did not
request specific counts on the total charges, indictments, terminations, arrests, or convictions as
a direct result of each case.

Table 11. Case outcomes by case type with no pending additional outcomes as percentage of total
outcomes for each outcome type.

ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

TOTAL
19.61%
17.65%
35.29%
27.45%
100.00%

CHARGE
14.29%
23.81%
61.90%
0.00%
100.00%

INDICTMENT
28.57%
7.14%
64.29%
0.00%
100.00%

TERMINATION
14.29%
14.29%
47.62%
23.81%
100.00%

ARREST
21.05%
21.05%
57.89%
0.00%
100.00%

CONVICTION
17.65%
17.65%
64.71%
0.00%
100.00%

Fraud cases totaled 18 out of 51 (35.29%) of non-pending cases and resulted in the
highest outcome rate in each recorded outcome type despite encompassing just over 35% of
these cases. Specifically, fraud covered 13 out of 21 (61.90%) cases that resulted in charges
filed, 9 out of 14 (64.29%) of cases with an indictment, 10 out of 21 (47.62%) of cases with at
least one termination, 11 out of 19 (57.89%) of cases with at least one arrest, and 11 out of 17
(64.71%) cases that resulted in a conviction.
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Waste cases totaled 14 out of 51 (27.45%) of non-pending cases and resulted in the
least likelihood for any of the recorded outcome types. Specifically, waste covered 0 out of 21
(0%) cases that resulted in charges filed, 0 out of 14 (0%) of cases with an indictment, 5 out of 21
(23.81%) of cases with at least one termination, 0 out of 19 (0%) of cases with at least one arrest,
and 0 out of 17 (0%) cases that resulted in a conviction.
Abuse cases totaled 10 out of 51 (19.61%) of non-pending cases. Specifically, abuse
covered 3 out of 21 (14.29%) cases that resulted in charges filed, 4 out of 14 (28.57%) of cases
with an indictment, 3 out of 21 (14.29%) of cases with at least one termination, 4 out of 19
(21.05%) of cases with at least one arrest, and 3 out of 17 (17.65%) cases that resulted in a
conviction.
Corruption cases totaled 9 out of 51 (35.29%) of non-pending cases. Specifically,
corruption covered 5 out of 21 (23.81%) cases that resulted in charges filed, 1 out of 14 (7.14%)
of cases with an indictment, 3 out of 21 (14.29%) of cases with at least one termination, 4 out of
19 (21.05%) of cases with at least one arrest, and 3 out of 17 (17.65%) cases that resulted in a
conviction.

Table 12. Case outcomes by case type with pending additional outcomes.

TOTAL
ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

3
3
14
3
23

CHARGE
1
2
8
0
11

INDICTMENT
1
1
4
0
6

TERMINATION
0
1
7
0
8

ARREST

CONVICTION
0
1
6
0
7

The survey also requested an additional outcome, if any, that the respondents attributed
to each case. This produced a series of responses that spoke to specific outcomes related to the
cases, but two common themes emerged: (1) policy or internal control change as a result of the
case, and (2) Other outcome similar to termination, either: debarred for lawyers, contract
terminated for contractors (including “Vendex” delisting), and forced resignations or retirements.
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0
2
3
0
5

Chapter 5: Analysis & Findings
Summary
This findings section covers the (1) Outcome analysis using a series of binary logistic
regressions against grouped common outcomes from fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption cases,
(2) the examination of the role of Inspectors General through a qualitative analysis of their selfdescribed office mission statements as well as a model of what makes cases significant, (3) a
model of the obstacles faced by investigators while attempting to conduct a thorough
investigation, and (4) a binary logistic regression examining the same common case outcomes
against the predictor of material support by software.

Outcomes
1. What outcomes are correlated with a successfully thorough investigation?
After including and coding for the additional outcome variables that were shared by the
respondents, the following primary categories were created as dependent variables:

1. Legal outcome (Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or Conviction)
2. Termination (Termination, forced resignation/retirement, or debarred)
3. Policy (Policy/Internal control changes)
4. Recovery (Any financial recovery)

The resulting binary logistic regression model, which has expanded the definitions of
Terminations and added the outcome of Policy, is detailed as:
Dependent Variables:
VARIABLE
LEGAL

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

TERMINATE

BINARY VALUE

POLICY

BINARY VALUE
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DESCRIPTION
Any Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or
Conviction
Termination, contractor barred, forced
resignation, forced retirement, or
debarred
Policy or internal control changes

RECOVERY

BINARY VALUE

Any financial recovery

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Was a thorough investigation able to
occur

Independent Variables:
VARIABLE
CRITICAL_SUCCESS

Legal Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a legal outcome, such as
arrest, indictment, charges, or conviction based on whether the investigation was able to be
conducted thoroughly. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For
complete statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which
cases could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of
the Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test of whether case being conducted thoroughly
impacted dependent variable, and (5) the model summary, fit, and final equation, see appendix
(“OUTPUT 1. Predicting legal outcome of case based on ability to conduct thorough
investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case was able to be conducted
thoroughly did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a legal outcome (p=0.538,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

100.251a

Nagelkerke R
Square

.005

.007

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_LEGAL

0

0
46

31

Percentage
Correct
.0

1

0

43

100.0

Overall Percentage

58.1

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

-.299

.485

.380

1

.538

.742

.442

.302

2.139

1

.144

1.556

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.

Policy Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a policy outcome, such as a
policy or internal control change based on whether the investigation was able to be conducted
thoroughly. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete
statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases
could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the
Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 2. Predicting policy outcome of case
based on ability to conduct thorough investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case was able to be conducted
thoroughly did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a legal outcome (p=0.958,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
101.228a

Cox & Snell R
Square

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
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.000

Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_POLICY

Percentage
Correct

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS

-.025

.484

.003

1

.958

.975

Constant

-.262

.297

.778

1

.378

.769

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
Recovery Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a recovery outcome, which
was any financial recovery, based on whether the investigation was able to be conducted
thoroughly. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete
statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases
could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the
Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 3. Predicting recovery outcome of
case based on ability to conduct thorough investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case was able to be conducted
thoroughly did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a legal outcome (p=0.914,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
97.101a

Cox & Snell R
Square
.000
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Nagelkerke R
Square
.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y

1

Percentage
Correct

0

47

0

100.0

1

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
Step 1a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS

-.054

.499

.012

1

.914

.948

Constant

-.534

.305

3.057

1

.080

.586

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
Termination Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a termination outcome,
which was a termination, a contractor being barred, a forced resignation, forced retirement, or
debarment, based on whether the investigation was able to be conducted thoroughly. All 74
cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete statistical test
output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases could be
included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the Enter
method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 4. Predicting termination outcome of case
based on ability to conduct thorough investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case was able to be conducted
thoroughly did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a legal outcome (p=0.856,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.
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Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

102.499a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

.001

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 2 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 1

0

1

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1

Percentage
Correct

0

36

.0

0

38

100.0

Overall Percentage

51.4

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

-.087

.480

.033

1

.856

.917

.087

.295

.087

1

.768

1.091

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.

When running the above regressions, no statistical significance was found using
CRITICAL_SUCCESS to predict any of the outcomes tested. Essentially, the presence of a
thorough investigation not was tied to a statistical increase in the number of cases that ended
with any specific outcome group tested and this analysis cannot reject the null hypothesis. This
analysis found no correlation between the outcomes reported by respondents and whether the
investigation was able to be completed thoroughly.
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Inspector General Role
2. What do Inspectors General see as their role?

Of the 18 investigators that were surveyed, 13 provided the mission of their office, while 5
requested that their mission response be copied from their office website to ensure they did not
provide an incomplete, inaccurate, or rushed explanation. Using the 13 responses, a content
analysis word matrix was created to determine frequency of word and theme use. Fields
annotated with an asterisk (*) reflect cases where synonyms were used. For investigate, the
synonyms were: find, uncover, and root out. The definition for root from Merriam-Webster (2019)
is “to find and remove (something or someone)” with the first component being find. Root was
used again later for the second component of “and remove”. The synonyms or related phrasing
used for root out, as an action verb, were: “bring efficiency”, “with an eye for prosecution or
indictment”, and pursue.

Figure 5. Thematic analysis of investigator mission.

Inspector General Mission Themes
Fraud
Investigate*
Waste
Abuse
Root*
Prevent
Misconduct
Efficiency
Corruption
Audit
Deter
0
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6
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At the outset of this study, one of the goals was to establish a common definition for the
mission of Inspector General’s see for their role. Citing the above analysis, fraud, waste, abuse,
misconduct, [in]efficiency, and corruption are the common subjects of investigator’s mission.
Investigate, root [out], prevent, audit, and deter are the common actions that these investigator’s
shared. While the mission and scope will vary by the form and function of each investigator’s
office, the goal of Investigating and rooting out fraud, waste, and abuse is the most common
definition. A more inclusive goal may be Prevent, investigate, and root out fraud, waste, abuse,
misconduct, and corruption to preserve or restore efficiency.

Case Significance
3. What makes cases significant to Inspector General?

The prevailing themes for the respondent explanation of what made a particular case
significant were financial scale of the case, the prestige or influence of the individual or individuals
being investigated, and the perceived moral audacity of the particular offenses relating to their
victim demographics. This study also reveals an underlying connection between the investigator’s
tasked mission as an Inspector General and the types of cases that are prioritized and resourced,
demonstrating how they use their investigational discretion to advance that mission.
This study also offers an explanation for the perceived successful outcomes of
investigations as retributive justice for the purpose of reducing Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and
Corruption. The common explanation by respondents that the resulting outcomes, despite not
achieving all possible positive outcomes relating to criminal exposure, asset recovery, or public
remedy, were still successes hinged on the underlying common goal of retribution for the sake of
social and governmental order. This is also seen as promoting both general and specific
deterrence (Stafford & Warr, 1993).

Obstacles
4. What impedes a thorough investigation?
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The resulting model from coding the obstacles faced by investigators when attempting to
conduct a thorough investigation can explained by the summarized descriptions of each obstacle.
Primary obstacles to thorough investigations were suspect cooperation, political, evidence quality,
jurisdictional, bureaucratic, legal limits, limited skillsets, scope, and understaffing. Further
breakdown provides a potential reflexive survey to catalog occurrences of these obstacles within
and around investigations.

Software
5. Is software critical to the successful completion of investigations?
Using the same outcome variables that were coded during the Outcome section, the following
primary categories were created as dependent variables:

1. Legal outcome (Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or Conviction)
2. Termination (Termination, forced resignation/retirement, or debarred)
3. Policy (Policy/Internal control changes)
4. Recovery (Any financial recovery)

Dependent Variables:
VARIABLE
LEGAL

TYPE
BINARY VALUE

TERMINATE

BINARY VALUE

POLICY
RECOVERY

BINARY VALUE
BINARY VALUE

DESCRIPTION
Any Arrest, Indictment, Charges, or
Conviction
Termination, forced resignation, forced
retirement, or debarred
Policy or internal control changes
Any financial recovery

Independent Variables:
VARIABLE
SOFTWARE_ASSIST

TYPE
BINARY VALUE
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DESCRIPTION
Was any software used to materially
assist you in performing the
investigation functions for this incident

Legal Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a legal outcome, such as
arrest, indictment, charges, or conviction based on whether software was used to materially
assist the investigation. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For
complete statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which
cases could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of
the Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 5. Predicting legal outcome of
case based on material use of software to aid investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case involved material assistance by
software did have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a legal outcome (p=0.035, <=
0.05).

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

95.583a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.066

.089

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_LEGAL

Percentage
Correct

0

8

23

25.8

1

3

40

93.0

Overall Percentage

64.9

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST

1.534

.726

4.468

1

.035

4.638

Constant

-.981

.677

2.099

1

.147

.375
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.

Explanation
The introduction of SOFTWARE_ASSIST as an independent variable produced a
significant impact (p=0.035) on the dependent variable. Stated otherwise, the use of software
during an investigation had a positive material impact on a LEGAL outcome occurring, such as
arrest, criminal charges, indictments, or convictions. The Odds Ratio Exp(B) of 4.638
demonstrates a high likelihood of 4.638 to 1 that the use of software during an investigation will
result in a legal outcome. Overall, the model was able to predict 64.9% of cases resulting in a
legal outcome based on the usage of software to materially assist the investigation.
The same analysis is conducted below for each of the other measured outcomes but did
not produce statistically significant results.

Policy Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a policy outcome, such as a
policy or internal control change based on whether software was used to materially assist the
investigation. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete
statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases
could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the
Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 6. Predicting policy outcome of case
based on material use of software to aid investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case involved material assistance by
software did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a policy outcome (p=0.873,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
101.205a

Cox & Snell R
Square
.000
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Nagelkerke R
Square
.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_POLICY

Percentage
Correct

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST

-.105

.657

.026

1

.873

.900

Constant

-.182

.606

.091

1

.763

.833

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.

Recovery Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a recovery outcome, which
was any financial recovery, based on whether software was used to materially assist the
investigation. All 74 cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete
statistical test output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases
could be included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the
Enter method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 7. Predicting recovery outcome of
case based on material use of software to aid investigation.”).
When running this regression model, whether a case involved material assistance by
software did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a recovery outcome
(p=0.187, p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
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Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

95.066a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.027

.037

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER 0
Y
1

1

Percentage
Correct

47

0

100.0

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

1.085

.823

1.739

1

.187

2.961

-1.504

.782

3.702

1

.054

.222

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.
Termination Outcome
This binary logistic regression analysis tests the likelihood of a termination outcome,
which was a termination, a contractor being barred, a forced resignation, forced retirement, or
debarment, based on whether software was used to materially assist the investigation. All 74
cases had a value and were able to be included in the analysis. For complete statistical test
output, which includes: (1) case processing summary which details which cases could be
included in the analysis, (2) variable encoding detected, (3) block 0 (baseline) of the Enter
method logistic regression, (4) block 1 test (“OUTPUT 8. Predicting termination outcome of case
based on material use of software to aid investigation.”).
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When running this regression model, whether a case involved material assistance by
software did not have a statistically significant impact on likelihood of a policy outcome (p=0.288,
p>0.05) as the p-value did not fall below the significance level of 0.05.

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

101.360a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.016

.021

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 1

0

1

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1

Percentage
Correct

7

29

19.4

4

34

89.5

Overall Percentage

55.4

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.719

.676

1.131

1

.288

2.052

-.560

.627

.797

1

.372

.571

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.

When running the above regressions, statistical significance was found using
SOFTWARE_ASSIST to predict a legal outcome. Essentially, having software materially assist an
investigation was tied to a statistical increase in the number of cases that ended with a legal
outcome of arrest, charges, indictment, or conviction. This analysis can accept the alternative
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hypothesis for legal outcomes. The tests for policy, recovery, and termination did not produce
statistically significant results and were not able to be predicted by software use.

Chapter 6: Implications, Limitations, & Conclusion
Research Questions
This study sought to obtain answers to five (5) research questions surrounding investigators
of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. The data to answer these questions was collected
through a survey, coded for generalizability, and finally analyzed in Chapter 5 for statistical
significance and common themes. Presented below is a discussion of each answer discovered in
the analysis section of this study.
1. What outcomes are correlated with a successfully thorough investigation?
This study sought to understand what outcomes are contingent with cases identified as
successfully thorough by Inspectors General. The study included the outcomes of Legal (Arrest,
Criminal Charges, Indictment, or Conviction), Financial Recovery (whether any of the survey
instrument scale values were recovered), Policy change of any kind, and Termination (if the case
resulted in terminations).
Through the use of four regression analyses, this study measured the impact of having
thorough investigations on achieving one of the four categories of outcomes. This study did not
identify a statistically significant relationship between an investigation being considered thorough
by the investigator and the likelihood that one of the outcomes above would be achieved. In other
words, this study identified that whether an investigation is seen as thorough does not impact the
likelihood of a case resulting in a legal outcome, financial recovery, policy change, or termination.
2. What do Inspectors General see as their role?
This study requested that respondents share the general aim of their investigative office as a
means for gathering a common definition for Inspectors General mission for their role. The survey
responses were coded to allow grouping of similar words and a frequency analysis was
performed on the resulting data set. The study identified the common shared-term definition for
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Inspectors General role as Investigating and rooting out fraud, waste, and abuse. The study also
identified a more inclusive role as Prevent, investigate, and root out fraud, waste, abuse,
misconduct, and corruption to preserve or restore efficiency.
3. What makes cases significant to Inspectors General?
This study asked respondents what made the cases that they shared significant. The most
common answers were financial scale of the case, the prestige or influence of the individual or
individuals being investigated, and the perceived moral audacity of the particular offenses relating
to their victim demographics. This study also highlights the opportunity for investigators to
demonstrate preference and discretion by which cases are prioritized and resourced.
4. What impedes a thorough investigation?
With each investigation that the respondents recalled, this study requested details of what, if
any, obstacles occurred during the course of the investigation that prevented a thorough
investigation from being conducted. Primary obstacles to thorough investigations were suspect
cooperation, political, evidence quality, jurisdictional, bureaucratic, legal limits, limited skillsets,
scope, and understaffing.
5. Is software material to the successful completion of investigations?
The survey requested specific information about the material use of software by investigators
during each investigation. Through the use of four regression analyses, this study measured the
impact of having material assistance from software on achieving one of the four categories of
outcomes. This study identified a statistically significant relationship between the material use of
software to assist an investigation and the likelihood that the case would result in a legal outcome
of arrest, charges, indictment, or conviction. Having software assistance did not impact the
likelihood of a case resulting in a financial recovery, policy change, or termination. In other words,
this study identified that the material use of software in investigations was tied to a higher
likelihood of obtaining a legal outcome for a case.
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Implications
Financial

The investigators responding to this survey all spoke to financial resource deficiency for
obtaining additional investigative tools in at least one of the cases that the respondent shared that
they considered a significant case. Tasked with identifying cases of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and
Corruption, this challenges the efficacy of their position by materially diminishing their capabilities.
It is unclear what additional outcomes could have been obtained by this added financial support
and this study did not request classification of those subjective possible outcomes.

Personnel

As identified in the Harris (2012) study, access to the necessary personnel or the ability
to hire the appropriate personnel was a limitation expressed by the respondents of this study. In
particular, this study further diagnoses this limitation as insufficient staff training before on-the-job
training necessity, a lack of staff expertise, a lack of understanding of new technology, and an
inability to assess or resolve these deficiencies.
Software
The survey question series regarding use of computer software to aid in the investigative
process was intended to illicit a collection of best practices and essential tools for this field. The
results demonstrate minimal use of specialized software by investigative personnel, reflecting
from the overwhelming lack of resources in the form of financial support and staffing to obtain and
properly utilize these applications. The use of highly accessible spreadsheet tools and specifically
sorting and filtering functionality was common in all fraud cases analyzed by this survey—namely
Microsoft Excel was the spreadsheet tool used by all investigators covered by this study.
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Other notable software mentioned included a variety of content analysis tools and suites,
specific capabilities of on-site video surveillance review, and advanced firewall filtering features
and their related log analysis tools.
When checking against possible outcomes, the usage of software was found to be a
statistically significant predictor of having a legal outcome of arrest, criminal charges, indictment,
or conviction. This study did not find a statistically significant relationship between software
assistance and the other outcomes checked: Policy and internal control changes, Terminations
and similar in effect outcomes, or financial recovery of any amount.

Limitations
The known limitations by the author of this study can be categorized as 1) survey
shortcomings that were discovered during coding and analysis and, 2) not including specific
questions regarding the non-software related workarounds to investigatory obstacles. While this
study had the Grounded Theory improvement option it was not practical to employ between the
fast-paced data collection routine with back to back interviews at conferences. Future study would
warrant test interviews to aid in the development of the survey instrument prior to the majority of
the data collection interviews.
The survey instrument shortcomings can be enumerated as:
1. Too many predictor variables requiring too many cases to achieve statistical significance
during the analysis.
2. Missed opportunity to scale outcomes as a potential dependent variable, allowing for a
multiple linear regression analysis.
3. Too many binary variables over ratio level variables that skew standard error.
Regarding the missed opportunity to answer additional questions, this study did not include
an explicit request for workarounds with the exception of discussing software related
workarounds. While respondents were given open-ended questions and provided meaningful
narrative of the workarounds employed, being able to include and code non-software
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workarounds into the data analysis model would have allowed for broader scope of the
applicability of the results.

Future Research
On the qualitive side, while this study was able to capture thematic hindrances to
thorough investigations and provide potential criteria on mission influence and case selection,
further study can expand these two research avenues to answer additional phenomenological
questions. In particular, what are workarounds that are used by Inspectors General in each of
these obstacle cases? Reflexively, how do these understood obstacles rank and influence the
course of work in Inspectors General investigations? What cases do investigatory discretion
potentially diminish action on?
From the quantitative side, this study analyzed material software impact on case outcome
finding a positive relationship between use of software and producing Legal outcomes. This study
also looked at the relationship between whether a case was characterized as thoroughly
investigated and what expected outcomes might be achieved—though there did not appear to be
any significant relationship between these variables. Further quantitative study could build a
larger variable set of predictors for outcomes, which would require significantly more cases, but
provide a more definitive internal validity measure.
Conclusions
Inspectors General serve a critical role in government institutions, protecting against
mismanagement through formalized evaluation and ongoing compliance monitoring. Previous
studies have determined distinct limitations on power and authority, citing political pressure
internal and external to government. This study further evaluates those obstacles and expands to
include specific limitations experienced by Inspectors General during the course of producing
thorough investigations.
At the outset of this study, the goal was to further understand the aids and impediments
to thorough investigations for Inspectors General. The analysis sought to characterize and
diagnose successful case outcomes while identifying whether there had been significant
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obstructions to a thorough investigation. A quantitative analysis revealed no correlation between
whether it was a thorough investigation and the achieved outcomes.
A second question from this study, what is the essential mission that Inspectors General
see themselves tasked with was answered with a theme analysis. A generalizable goal of:
Investigating and rooting out fraud, waste, and abuse, and a more inclusive: Prevent, investigate,
and root out fraud, waste, abuse, misconduct, and corruption to preserve or restore efficiency
were the preferred redux of their perceived roles.
Third, this study looked at whether software had a material impact on potential outcomes
for cases. Through a binomial logistic regression, multiple models were run to determine if
software support present impacted the dependent variables for outcome. Outcomes were
organized into Legal, Termination, Policy, and Recovery. Software impact on generating a legal
outcome (arrest, indictment, or conviction) was found to be statistically significant.
Fourth, this study sought to identify what makes cases significant in the eyes of
Inspectors General, who are awarded a significant amount of discretion over which cases to
prioritize. Participants in the study diagnosed case significance as primarily egregious cases that
betrayed a public trust or impacted a vulnerable group.
The fifth question asked by this study, diagnosing which obstacles prevent thorough
investigations from being concluded, produced suspect cooperation, political, evidence quality,
jurisdictional, bureaucratic, legal limits, limited skillsets, scope, and understaffing.
In light of these observations and characterizations, Inspectors General studies have
followed a common fiber of testing the limits of the role and responsibilities in the atmosphere of
restriction and limits. Research in this area has identified traits for success (Harris, 2014),
strategies for effective use of limited authority (Harris, 2012), and room for adaptation in even
more restrictive and even authoritarian climates (Feldman, 2017).
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Appendix A: Recruitment Script
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
The Graduate Center & John Jay College
Departments of Criminal Justice
RECRUITMENT SCRIPT
Hi, my name is Lawrence Kom. I am doctoral student at The Graduate Center, City University of
New York. I am conducting a research study designed to identify the aids and impediments to
investigations of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. The results of this study may aid in the
development of new investigative techniques and increase awareness of aids and obstructions to
investigations of this manner.
I’d like to ask you questions about your current and prior investigative positions as well as some
notable cases of fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption you investigated. This will take up to 30
minutes.
If you are interested in participating, I will provide you with a consent form to sign (or verbally
agree to, in case of phone interview) that provides more details about the study and the
protections I am employing to protect participant confidentially.
Are you interested in participating in this study?
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
The Graduate Center & John Jay College
Departments of Criminal Justice
CONSENT TO PARTICPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT

Title of Research Study: Investigations of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption in the
Public Sector: A Survey of Organizational and Software-Based Aids and Obstructions
Principal Investigator:

Lawrence Kom, MPA
Doctoral Candidate
The Graduate Center, CUNY

Faculty Advisor:

Warren Benton, Ph.D.
Professor & Chairperson
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Public Management

You are invited to participate in a research study because of your experience with
investigating cases of fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption.
Purpose:
The purpose of this research study is to better understand the aids and impediments to
investigations of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. The results of this study may aid
in the development of new investigative techniques and increase awareness of aids and
obstructions to investigations of this manner.
Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
• Answer questions about your current and former investigative positions and details
about the task and scope of these positions.
• Answer questions about cases you’ve investigated that you believe meet the
criteria of major cases of fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption.
Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 30 minutes.
Potential Risks or Discomforts:
To minimize any risks of performance disclosure no subjects will be identified by this study
and specific organizational and investigation attributes will not be connected to specific
responses.
If you decide to withdraw from this study, please contact the principal investigator
Lawrence Kom to inform them of your decision.
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Potential Benefits:
• You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study.
• Participating in the study may increase general knowledge of, and improvement
of, investigative techniques for Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption.
Payment for Participation:
You will not receive any payment for participating in this research study.
New Information:
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your
willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality:
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only
with your permission or as required by law.
We will protect your confidentiality by both coding the data and encrypting it. The collected
data will be stored on an encrypted hard drive. An entirely separate encrypted hard drive,
utilizing FileVault (OS X) and BitLocker (Windows) software will be used to store the
consent records and any other identifiable matching records.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this
type of research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the
research. Research records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain
identifiable information about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this
study will not identify you by name.
Participants’ Rights:
•
•

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled.
You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at
any time, without any penalty.

Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one
of the following researchers:
•

Lawrence Kom, Doctoral
lkom@gc.cuny.edu

Candidate,

Telephone:

815.277.9566,

Email:

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments
or concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers,
please call the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email
HRPP@cuny.edu. Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
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205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant:
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be
given a copy of this consent form to keep.
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Participant
Date
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent

_____________________________________________________
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent
Date
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Appendix C: Survey Instrument
Survey Overview:
Question sequence will be asked for each incident type (fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption).
Interviewees will be asked same questions in the same sequence for a critical success and failure
incident. Each interviewee will decide whether success is first or second in order. At the
conclusion of the critical success or failure sequence, each individual will be asked for another
similar incident that took place when they used different Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption
(FWAC) software tools. 2
The critical incident technique calls for probing questions that are framed in the context of
success and failure in regard to the general aim of a position. In the context of this study, the
General Aim is to investigate potential fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption (FWAC)—although
one would attribute success to instances of FWAC with a successful legal outcome on behalf of
the agency, an unobstructed investigation is more aligned with successful execution of the duties
for that position. As such, critical success would be investigations that were not substantially
hindered.
Incident types:
1. Fraud – intentional deception committed to conceal actions or transactions.
2. Waste –the use of financial and material resources or personnel for purposes not
directly related to the execution of duties and responsibilities of the organization.
3. Abuse – the misuse, allocation or improper treatment of financial or material resources
or personnel to perform tasks and activities which may be directly or indirectly related
to the execution of duties and responsibilities of the organization.
4. Corruption – use of power for activities not authorized by position
Survey Questions:
1. Current Investigative Role:
a. What is your current work position?
b. When did you take this position?
c. How many investigators work in your investigative office?
d. Roughly how many employees in your agency or organization is your investigative
office in charge of monitoring?
e. What is the general aim of your investigative office?
2. What were your previous work positions and when were they?
Think of the last major case of [incident type, description of incident type], that you
investigated, [on second pass: “that occurred with/without significant obstacles.”]
3. What made this incident significant?
4. Were there obstacles that prevented a thorough investigation from being conducted?
[On second pass: Skip to ‘4b’ or #5, without reading question #4]
a. (Yes=Critical Success, No=Critical Failure)
b. What were those obstacles?
5. Would you briefly describe the facts of this incident?
a. When did this incident occur?
b. Who, by position title, was involved in the incident?
c. If applicable, what or how much was missing?
2

FWAC software is any software used to detect, uncover, organize, evaluate, make calculations
on, or otherwise investigate evidence relevant to an investigation of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or
Corruption.
70

d. Who, by role, was involved in the investigation?
6. Did you use any software to materially assist you in performing the investigation functions
for this incident of [incident type]?
a. If yes:
i. Which software did you use?
ii. Which specific features did you find useful in this investigation?
b. If no:
iii. Was there a specific software feature or features that could have been useful
to you in this investigation?
c. Were there any software-related issues that hindered your investigation, either due
to: (Ask each)
iv. Software limitations? What was the workaround?
v. Software usage difficulties? What was the workaround?
vi. Other factors? What was the workaround?
7. Which of the following outcomes can be attributed to this incident? (Check off each)
a. Criminal Charges?
b. Indictment?
c. Termination?
d. Arrest?
e. Conviction?
f. Financial Recovery: (Pick one)
vii. Full 100%
viii. Greater than 50%
ix. Less than 50%
x. No Recovery
g. Case still pending?
h. Other? Specify.
8. Can you think of another significant case of [incident type] in the past similar to this one,
either in your current position or a past position, where you were using different software
for material support in your investigation?
a. [Repeat Questions 3 through 7]
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Inquiry structure:

Initial Inquiry

Critical Success

Critical Failure

Questions 3-8

Questions 3-8

Questions 3-7

Questions 3-7
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Appendix D: Tables & Figures
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Figure 1. Breakdown of respondent job positions.

Repondent's Job Position
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Investigator
Special Agent
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Figure 2. Total cases of Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Corruption collected.
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Waste

Figure 3. Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption cases investigated by year.
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Figure 4. Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption cases by financial amount missing or in question.
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Figure 5. Thematic analysis of investigator mission.
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Table 1. Total respondents, cases collected by type.
METRIC
TOTAL RESPONDENTS
TOTAL CASES
ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE

COUNT
19
74
13
12
32
17
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Table 2. Respondent employment and organizational attributes.
Position

Previous Position

General
Investigator
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Inspector General
Investigator
Investigator
Special Agent
Special Agent
Special Agent

Probation Officer
Unknown
Attorney
Inspector General
Investigator
Police
Auditor
Investigator
Attorney General Office
Unknown
Special Agent
Military
Auditor
Attorney
Military
Investigator
Investigator
Unknown
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Years in
Current
Position

Size of
Investigative
Office

Size of Agency
Investigated

2

5

100

2
5
6
2
5
4
5
1
11
16
1
3
2
4
13
1
2

350
30
4
6
2
13
17
12
13
10
1
9
4
10
15
600
38

25,000
50,000
20,000
9,000
4,000
7,000
600
500
4,000
4,800
60,000
500,000
160,000

Table 3. Matching cases by reason for significance.
REASON FOR SIGNIFICANCE

MATCHING CASES

FINANCIAL AMOUNT
VULNERABLE GROUP
MISAPPROPRIATION
HIGH RANKING OFFICAL
ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE
PUBLIC DISPLAY OF ABUSE
NUMBER INVOLVED
CORRUPT PUBLIC SERVANT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
BRIBERY
GOOD INVESTIGATION
PUBLIC SAFETY
CLEAR REMEDY
JAILTIME
WENT TO TRIAL

17
15
12
8
6
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
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Table 4. Matching cases by macro reason for significance.
CATEGORY
AMOUNT
FINANCIAL AMOUNT
VULNERABLE GROUP
VULNERABLE GROUP
OTHER NOTABILITY
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
BRIBERY
CLEAR REMEDY
GOOD INVESTIGATION
NUMBER INVOLVED
PUBLIC SAFETY
WENT TO TRIAL
JAILTIME
POSITION OF SUSPECT
CORRUPT PUBLIC SERVANT
HIGH RANKING OFFICAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION
MISAPPROPRIATION
MISAPPROPRIATION
ABUSE OF POWER
ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE
PUBLIC DISPLAY OF ABUSE
GRAND TOTAL

MATCHING CASES
17
17
15
15
14
2
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
14
3
8
3
12
12
11
6
5
83
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Table 5. Total cases, critical success or failure, and success rate by type.
CASE TYPE
FRAUD
WASTE
ABUSE
CORRUPTION

CASES
32
17
13
12

SUCCESS CASES
12
8
5
3

FAILURE CASES
20
9
8
9

SUCCESS RATE
37.50%
47.06%
38.46%
25.00%

74

28

46

37.01%
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Table 6. Total cases, critical success or failure, and success rate by type, for cases not pending
outcome only.
CASE TYPE
FRAUD
WASTE
ABUSE
CORRUPTION

CASES
18
14
10
9

SUCCESS CASES
5
6
4
2

FAILURE CASES
13
8
6
7

SUCCESS RATE
27.78%
42.86%
40.00%
22.22%

51

17

34

33.21%
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Table 7. Obstacle themes and matching case counts.
CATEGORY

COUNT

SUSPECT COOPERATION

14

EVIDENCE QUALITY

13

POLITICAL

13

JURISDICTIONAL

9

BUREACRATIC

8

LEGAL LIMITS

6

LIMITED SKILLSETS

4

SCOPE

3

UNDERSTAFFING

3
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Table 8. Obstacle themes and specific obstacle breakdowns.
OBSTACLE
SUSPECT COOPERATION
AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARY
COLLUSION, SOMEONE ALERTED SUSPECT
DIRECTOR UNCOOPERATIVE, STALLED, WITHHELD
RECORDS, HIRED ATTORNEY
LACK OF COOPERATION
MISSING INFORMATION FROM SUSPECT
ORIGINAL EMPLOYEES NO LONGER WITH GOVERNMENT
REFUSED TO PROVIDE RECORDS, RETAINED COUNSEL
RESISTANCE FROM EMPLOYEES TO CHANGE
LONGSTANDING CORRUPTION
SUSPECT ALREADY LEFT POSITION
SUSPECT RETAINED LEGAL COUNSEL
SUSPECTS PREVENTED INFORMATION SHARING WITH TOP
WITHHOLDING INFORMATION, CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS
POLITICAL
BUSINESS HAD CLOSE TIES
CITY MANAGEMENT WAS APPREHENSIVE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR STALLED
FEAR OF RETALIATION, "OLD SCHOOL" MENTALITY
HINDERED BY SUSPECT'S POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
LACK OF HIGHER MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
LEADERSHIP BIAS DESPITE BRIBERY ALLEGATIONS
LEGAL ATTENTION AND HURDLES DUE TO GOVERNMENT
MISTAKES
NO POPULAR OPINION TO ARREST
POLITICAL OBSTACLES
SENIOR PLAYERS UNAWARE OF IG AUTHORITY
TARGET WAS POLICE COMMANDER, SWORN STATUS
WELL CONNECTED
EVIDENCE QUALITY
1980S DATA SYSTEMS, UNABLE TO GENERATE FORMAT
NEEDED
COMPLAINANT HAD REPUTATION FOR DISHONESTY
FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
INADEQUATE RECORDS WITH CONTRACTOR
LACK OF DOCUMENTS, OLD TESTIMONY
LACK OF RECORD KEEPING, LACK OF DOCUMENTED
PROCEDURES, POOR DOCUMENT FOR CHAIN OF CUSTODY
MAJORITY OF INTERVIEW WAS FALSIFIED INFORMATION
MISSING RECORDS
SMART TECH PEOPLE HID MONEY WELL.
SUSPECT TAMPERED WITH EVIDENCE IN DATABASE
UNDER REPORTING, INACCURATE REPORTING
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COUNT
14
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
13
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

VIDEO EVIDENCE FAILURE, BECAME HIS WORD VS HIS
WORD
JURISDICTIONAL
COMPETING AUDITING AGENCIES
DEALING WITH OTHER STATE AGENCIES
INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIP/ROLES
INTERAGENCY DIFFERENCES
INTERAGENCY DISPUTE ABOUT OWNING PROCESS,
EVIDENCE, RELEASE
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, DIFFERING SOFTWARE
NEEDED TO FIND TRAVEL MONEY
PARALLEL FEDERAL INVESTIGATION
SEVERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED
BUREACRATIC
AGENCY SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED IT
CHALLENGE OF WORKING WITH POLICE
CHALLENGING JURISDICTION TO NAVIGATE
DELAY IN SUBPOENA RESPONSES
INADEQUATE PROSECUTION
MANAGEMENT WANTED INFO BEFORE INVESTIGATION
COMPLETE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WROTE LAWS AND KNEW WAY AROUND
THEM
SUSPECT COULD REVIEW ALL TESTIMONY
LEGAL LIMITS
INSUFFICIENT SUBPOENA POWER
LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
LIMITED POWER
NEEDED COURT ORDER TO GET CORRECT SUBPOENA
NO SUBPOENA POWER, SUSPECTS RETAINED COUNSEL,
REFUSED TESTIMONY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
LIMITED SKILLSETS
INSUFFICIENT STAFF TRAINING BEFORE ON-THE-JOB
LACK OF STAFF EXPERTISE
NEW TECHNOLOGY
NOT ENOUGH ABILITY TO ASSES OR RESOLVE
SCOPE
COMPLEX, LOTS OF DOCUMENTS
TIME AND VOLUME OF CASE MATERIAL
UNDERSTAFFING
INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES
NOT ENOUGH MANPOWER
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1
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
3
2
1

Table 9. Types of software used for each case.
TYPE OF SOFTWARE
SPREADSHEETS
DATABASE
CASE MANAGEMENT
FORENSICS
OTHER

MATCHING CASES
48
16
8
15
3
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Table 10. Case outcomes by case type with no pending additional outcomes.

ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

TOTAL
10
9
18
14
51

CHARGE
3
5
13
0
21

INDICTMENT
4
1
9
0
14

89

TERMINATION
3
3
10
5
21

ARREST
4
4
11
0
19

CONVICTION
3
3
11
0
17

Table 11. Case outcomes by case type with no pending additional outcomes as percentage of
total outcomes for each outcome type.

ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

TOTAL
19.61%
17.65%
35.29%
27.45%
100.00%

CHARGE
14.29%
23.81%
61.90%
0.00%
100.00%

INDICTMENT
28.57%
7.14%
64.29%
0.00%
100.00%
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TERMINATION
14.29%
14.29%
47.62%
23.81%
100.00%

ARREST
21.05%
21.05%
57.89%
0.00%
100.00%

CONVICTION
17.65%
17.65%
64.71%
0.00%
100.00%

Table 12. Case outcomes by case type with pending additional outcomes.
TOTAL
ABUSE
CORRUPTION
FRAUD
WASTE
TOTAL

3
3
14
3
23

CHARGE
1
2
8
0
11

INDICTMENT
1
1
4
0
6
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TERMINATION
0
1
7
0
8

ARREST

CONVICTION
0
1
6
0
7

0
2
3
0
5

OUTPUT 1. Predicting legal outcome of case based on ability to conduct thorough investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

Missing Cases
Total
Unselected Cases
Total

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
0
1

Observed
Step 0

OUTCOME_LEGAL

Percentage
Correct

0

0

31

.0

1

0

43

100.0

Overall Percentage

58.1

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

.327

S.E.

Wald

.236

1.929

df

Sig.
1

Exp(B)

.165

1.387

Variables not in the Equation
Score

92

df

Sig.

Step 0

Variables

CRITICAL_SUCCESS

Overall Statistics

.381

1

.537

.381

1

.537

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

.380

1

.538

Block

.380

1

.538

Model

.380

1

.538

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

100.251a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.005

.007

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_LEGAL

Percentage
Correct

0

0

31

.0

1

0

43

100.0

Overall Percentage

58.1

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

-.299

.485

.380

1

.538

.742

.442

.302

2.139

1

.144

1.556

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
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OUTPUT 2. Predicting policy outcome of case based on ability to conduct thorough investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

Missing Cases
Total
Unselected Cases
Total

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Observed
Step 0

OUTCOME_POLICY

Percentage
Correct

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

S.E.

-.272

Wald

.235

1.343

Variables not in the Equation
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df

Sig.
1

.246

Exp(B)
.762

Score
Step 0

Variables

CRITICAL_SUCCESS

df

Sig.

.003

1

.958

.003

1

.958

Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Percentage
Correct

Overall Statistics

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

.003

1

.958

Block

.003

1

.958

Model

.003

1

.958

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

101.228a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_POLICY

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS

-.025

.484

.003

1

.958

.975

Constant

-.262

.297

.778

1

.378

.769

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
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OUTPUT 3. Predicting recovery outcome of case based on ability to conduct thorough
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 0

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER 0
Y
1

Percentage
Correct

1
47

0

100.0

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

-.554

S.E.

Wald

.241

96

5.269

df

Sig.
1

.022

Exp(B)
.574

Variables not in the Equation
Score
Step 0

Variables

CRITICAL_SUCCESS

Overall Statistics

df

Sig.

.012

1

.914

.012

1

.914

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

.012

1

.914

Block

.012

1

.914

Model

.012

1

.914

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

97.101a

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y

1

Percentage
Correct

0

47

0

100.0

1

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B

S.E.
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Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Step 1a CRITICAL_SUCC
ESS

-.054

.499

.012

1

.914

.948

Constant

-.534

.305

3.057

1

.080

.586

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
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OUTPUT 4. Predicting termination outcome of case based on ability to conduct thorough
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 0

0

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1

Percentage
Correct

1
0

36

.0

0

38

100.0

Overall Percentage

51.4

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

.054

S.E.

Wald

.233

99

.054

df

Sig.
1

.816

Exp(B)
1.056

Variables not in the Equation
Score
Step 0

Variables

CRITICAL_SUCCESS

Overall Statistics

df

Sig.

.033

1

.856

.033

1

.856

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

.033

1

.856

Block

.033

1

.856

Model

.033

1

.856

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

102.499a

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

.001

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 2 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1
Overall Percentage

1

Percentage
Correct

0

36

.0

0

38

100.0
51.4

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

100

B
Step 1a CRITICAL_SUC
CESS
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

-.087

.480

.033

1

.856

.917

.087

.295

.087

1

.768

1.091

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: CRITICAL_SUCCESS.
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OUTPUT 5. Predicting legal outcome of case based on material use of software to aid
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
Observed
Step 0

0

OUTCOME_LEGAL

1

Percentage
Correct

0

0

31

.0

1

0

43

100.0

Overall Percentage

58.1

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

.327

S.E.

Wald

.236

Variables not in the Equation
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1.929

df

Sig.
1

.165

Exp(B)
1.387

Score
Step 0

Variables

SOFTWARE_ASSIST

Overall Statistics

df

Sig.

5.047

1

.025

5.047

1

.025

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

5.048

1

.025

Block

5.048

1

.025

Model

5.048

1

.025

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

95.583a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.066

.089

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_LEGAL
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_LEGAL

1

Percentage
Correct

0

8

23

25.8

1

3

40

93.0

Overall Percentage

64.9

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST

1.534

.726

4.468

1

.035

4.638

Constant

-.981

.677

2.099

1

.147

.375

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.
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OUTPUT 6. Predicting policy outcome of case based on material use of software to aid
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

Missing Cases
Total
Unselected Cases
Total

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Observed
Step 0

OUTCOME_POLICY

Percentage
Correct

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

-.272

S.E.

Wald

.235

1.343

df

Sig.
1

Exp(B)

.246

Variables not in the Equation
Score

104

df

Sig.

.762

Step 0

Variables

SOFTWARE_ASSIST

Overall Statistics

.026

1

.873

.026

1

.873

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

.026

1

.873

Block

.026

1

.873

Model

.026

1

.873

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

101.205a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.000

.000

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_POLICY
0
1

Observed
Step 1

OUTCOME_POLICY

Percentage
Correct

0

42

0

100.0

1

32

0

.0

Overall Percentage

56.8

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST

-.105

.657

.026

1

.873

.900

Constant

-.182

.606

.091

1

.763

.833

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.
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OUTPUT 7. Predicting recovery outcome of case based on material use of software to aid
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 0

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER 0
Y
1

Percentage
Correct

1
47

0

100.0

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

-.554

S.E.

Wald

.241

106

5.269

df

Sig.
1

.022

Exp(B)
.574

Variables not in the Equation
Score
Step 0

Variables

SOFTWARE_ASSIST

Overall Statistics

df

Sig.

1.868

1

.172

1.868

1

.172

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

2.047

1

.153

Block

2.047

1

.153

Model

2.047

1

.153

Model Summary
Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

95.066a

1

Nagelkerke R
Square

.027

.037

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_RECOVER
Y
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_RECOVER 0
Y
1

1

Percentage
Correct

47

0

100.0

27

0

.0

Overall Percentage

63.5

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B
a

Step 1

SOFTWARE_AS
SIST
Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

1.085

.823

1.739

1

.187

2.961

-1.504

.782

3.702

1

.054

.222

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.
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OUTPUT 8. Predicting termination outcome of case based on material use of software to aid
investigation.

Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

N

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent
74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

0

.0

74

100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value
Internal Value
0

0

1

1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 0

0

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1

1

Percentage
Correct

0

36

.0

0

38

100.0

Overall Percentage

51.4

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

.054

S.E.

Wald

.233

108

.054

df

Sig.
1

.816

Exp(B)
1.056

Variables not in the Equation
Score
Step 0

Variables

SOFTWARE_ASSIST

Overall Statistics

df

Sig.

1.162

1

.281

1.162

1

.281

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

1.172

1

.279

Block

1.172

1

.279

Model

1.172

1

.279

Model Summary
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

101.360a

Nagelkerke R
Square

.016

.021

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Tablea
Predicted
OUTCOME_TERMINAT
E
Observed
Step 1

0

OUTCOME_TERMINAT 0
E
1
Overall Percentage

1

Percentage
Correct

7

29

19.4

4

34

89.5
55.4

a. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
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B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Step 1a SOFTWARE_AS
SIST

.719

.676

1.131

1

.288

2.052

Constant

-.560

.627

.797

1

.372

.571

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SOFTWARE_ASSIST.
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